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Special Project
FAIR TREATMENT FOR THE LICENSED
PROFESSIONAL: THE MISSOURI ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARING COMMISSION'
INTRODUCTION
Although conditioning the practice of a profession or particular oc-
cupation upon the prior approval of an official body-licensure-is of
ancient origin, it is only in the 20th century that the phenomenon has
become pervasive. 2 Since the turn of the century the range of activities
and number of individuals covered by occupational licensing laws have
continually increased in every state,3 to the point that today, in Missouri
alone, 34 occupations and professions, and over 218,000 people4 are sub-
ject to the control of state occupational licensing authorities.
This quantitative explosion of governmental regulation by licensing
has, out of necessity, placed an increased emphasis -on the procedure by
which a state grants and revokes its approval because, assuming that the
substance of the law is not subject to attack, procedural safeguards are the
1. This study was done under a research grant from the American Bar
Foundation. The analyses, conclusions, and opinions expressed are those of the
authors, however, and not those of the Foundation, its officers, directors, or others
associated with its work.
The empirical research for this study was conducted during the Summer of
1971 by Mr. John S. Sandberg, who also prepared the final draft of the study.
Mr. James D. Edgar and Mr. Virgil Kenneth Rohrer participated in much of the
research preliminary to the empirical study. Messrs. Sandberg, Edgar and Rohrer
were members of the staff of the Missouri Law Review at the time this article
was prepared and each received his J.D. degree from the University of Missouri-
Columbia in June of 1972.
2. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENtS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 2, 23, 78-80 (1952), for the results of surveys indicating
the growth of licensing in the last half-century.
Though it is only with the coming of modem society that licensing laws have
become widely used, the concept of licensing is of medieval origin. The -merchant,
craft and professional guilds of the Middle Ages were used both to protect the
community from unfair practices and to eliminate competition. Id. at 10-11.
For a comparison between guilds and licensure, see Grant, The Guild Returns to
America, 4 J. POL. 303, 458 (1942). Even statutory regulation appeared in England
in the 16th century, when a law was passed restricting itinerant salesmen from
freely practicing their trades. See Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296, 306 (1895).
3. As early as 1934 one study indicated that over 250 different trades and
occupations were subject to licensing restrictions in one or more localities. W. GELL-
HORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESrRAINTS 194 n.4 (1956),
citing W. BEARD, GOVERNMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 494 (1934). By 1960, New York
City alone listed "nearly 1,400 categories of activity or employment ... requiring
licenses, permits, certificates or other official approval." Haitch, About: Licenses,
N.Y. Times, March 5, 1961, (Magazine), at 100.
4. Based on figures provided by the licensing agencies. The breakdown by
agency, number of activities licensed, and number of licenses is as follows:
(410)
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individual's only protections if a state contends that the individual has
not complied with the statutory requirements or conditions. The nature
and extent of these procedural safeguards may very well determine whether
or not the individual can realistically assert his claim or defense and thus
protect his livelihood.
Administrative procedure acts have been passed, in one form or an-
other, in many states to protect individual rights and to assure a fair and
impartial determination of administrative (including licensing) disputes.
But the likelihood that this goal of administrative due process is being
achieved in occupational licensing disputes is doubtful, for several reasons:
(1) many licensing agencies are only rarely involved in formal dis-
putes, and are therefore unfamiliar with procedural requirements
when disputes do arise;
(2) the agency members are often the prosecutor, judge, and jury in
the particular case;
(8) the members of each agency are typically drawn from the regulated
profession or occupation and are, therefore, usually untrained in
legal procedure; and
(4) the administrative procedure in many states is unclear or inade-
quate with respect to the protections extended.
While a few states have moved toward alleviating these problems,5 general
reform has been lacking.
In 1965 Missouri proposed to remedy these defects, and thereby pro-
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This amounts to 11.4% of Missouri's nonagricultural labor force.
5. See note 210 infra.
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the Administrative Hearing Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
AHC).6 Basically, the AHC was empowered by statute to "conduct hear-
ings and make findings of fact and conclusions of law" on all questions
involving the issuance, revocation, suspension or probation of certain
occupational licenses,7 a power formerly exercised exclusively by the re-
spective occupational licensing agencies.8 According to one of the drafters
of the statute, the express objective of creating this unique commission
was to place "a neutral lawyer in the position of holding a legal-like fair
and impartial hearing in compliance with due process of the law."9
Over six years have now elapsed since the creation of the AHC. Has
the AHC fulfilled the expectations of its creators by providing a solution
to the procedural problems that have occurred in the past? Has the goal of
providing an impartial tribunal to decide disputed questions of fact and
law, without detriment to the bona fide purposes of occupational licensing
laws, been met? Or have the predictions of the original opponents of the
AHC become a reality? Has the AHG procedure proved to be, at best, a
mere alternative to the proceedings conducted by the agencies before
1965? Has it, in addition, created such new problems as establishing the
commissioner of the AHC as a "czar with a life or death strangle-hold"'1
over an occupation, who makes "decisions in areas of conduct in which
lie is not an expert?"'"
The purpose of this article is to answer these questions and to make
an objective appraisal of the effectiveness of the AHO in the light of its
short but sometimes turbulent history.
Part I will outline briefly the problems and techniques of occupational
licensing by governmental agencies, and will examine the current trends
in both the legislatures and the courts toward allowing increased govern-
mental control through licensure. The purpose of this part will be to put
the role of the AHG in perspective with the entire field of licensing.
Part II will consider the common procedural protections afforded
licensees in administrative proceedings conducted by licensing agencies
under state administrative procedure acts, in order to provide a basis for
comparison with the protections provided licensees under the AHC
statute and rules.
6. §§ 161.252-342, RSMo 1969. For the text of the act, see APPENDIX No. I.
7. § 161.272, RSMo 1969.
8. See, e.g., § 335.170, RSMo 1969, which has remained unchanged since
1965 and still states that the State Board of Nursing has the power to hear and
decide questions relating to the denial, suspension or revocation of licenses. This
provision was impliedly repealed by § 11 (see ApPrNDIX No. 1) of the original
bill, which repealed all conflicting provisions of existing statutes. Some, but not
all, of the statutes have since been revised to comply with the AHC statute. See, e.g.,
§ 332.341 (3), RSMo 1969.
9. Letter from Lt. Gov. Thomas F. Eagleton to Gov. Warren E. Hearnes,
July 14, 1965.
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Part III will analyze the procedural protections offered by the AHC,
and will examine the background of the AHC and its subsequent history.
The effectiveness of the AHC will be evaluated on the basis of the results
of empirical research into the satisfaction of the involved parties (i.e., the
agencies, licensees, commissioners and attorneys), and into the case his-
tories. The article will conclude with an analysis of the AHC's strong and
weak points and an answer to the question whether the AHO has proved
an effective remedy.
I. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: AN OVERVIEW
A. Introduction
Once an occupation is subjected to state control by licensing, the in-
dividual must play the game by the rules. To understand the importance of
these "rules" to the individual, it is helpful to lay a foundation covering
the concept, method and motives for licensing and the courts' attitudes
toward the expanding scope of occupational licensing laws.
B. What is a License?
Although in the past, many courts and writers have defined a license
as a governmental permission to do something that would otherwise be
illegal,' 2 such a definition has been seriously questioned today.' 3 Although
prior permission is a condition to engaging in the activity licensed, most
courts recognize that a licensing program is regulation of a lawful activity.
Of course, a license does not have to be called such in order to be one. Any
governmental permission may be a "license" in effect, although it be called
a "permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory
exemption or other form of permission. 1 4 If some form of permission is
a condition precedent to engaging in an activity, it is, definitionally, a
"license."
These definitions embrace a range of included activities of such magni-
tude that the scope of the definition is almost incomprehensible. For
example, while it is easy to understand that licenses to drive, hunt, prac-
tice law, practice medicine or be a plumber are all properly includible
within the scope of the definition, a zoning variance, while technically a
"license," is not commonly understood as such. One encounters the same
classification problem with a union card, a federal approval of a corporate
merger, an occupancy permit, a burial permit, a tax exemption, or even
12. See, e.g., Galvan v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 452 P.2d 930, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 642 (1969); Knecht v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 186 Pa. Super. 456, 143 A.2d 820
(1958); City of Ft. Worth v. Gulf Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1935); 2 BoUvIER's
LAW DICTIONARY 1976 (8th ed. 1914); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra
note I at 5; W. GELLHORN 8 C. BysE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 538 (5th ed. 1970).
13. Holmer, The Role and Function of State Licensing Agencies, 40 STATE
GOV'T 34 (1967).
14. Administrative Procedure Act § 2 (e), 5 U.S.C. § 551 (8) (1970). This is
the federal "definition" of license. Interestingly, the states, which have the great-
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admission to the White House press corps-all of these "activities" require
as a condition precedent some form of governmental permission.
If the definition of "license" is restricted to the field of occupational
licensing (eliminating for the moment business licenses, revenue licenses
and "implied" licenses), the range of activities still remains unmanageably
broad. Licensing laws govern dry cleaners,15 hypertrichologists, 1 cotton
classifiers, 17 cotton samplers,' 8 horseshoers, 19 tree experts, 20 car sales-
men, 21 and persons fishing for sockeye or pink salmon in the Fraser River
system, 22 to name a few. The problem is further aggravated by the prolifera-
tion of licensing authorities (local, state, federal and quasi-governmental
agencies), and divergent schemes of licensing. Nevertheless, there appear
to be some fundamental or common characteristics as to the types and
purposes of licenses and the methods of licensure.
Categories of licensed activities are definable based on the purpose
that the law requiring licensure is meant to accomplish. Broadly speak-
ing, licenses are used for the alternative purposes of revenue, registration,
or regulation; but each category has attributes of the other two categories.
Requiring an individual or organization to obtain a license in order
to raise revenue is quite common. Municipalities are the most common
users of revenue licenses. Assuming it has the power to license,23 a munici-
pality may license a broad range of activities.24 The result is that the licens-
ing is more aptly described as "business" rather than occupational. How-
ever, "business" licenses, although basically used for revenue, do regulate
the subject of the license either implicitly or explicitly. As all taxing meas-
ures regulate to some degree, a license tax is at least implicitly regulatory,
if not sometimes prohibitory. This becomes obvious when activities such
as tatooing and fortune telling require a license fee of $100 per day.25
Furthermore, explicit regulatory measures may also be included in the
ordinance or statute. For example, the City of Columbia, Missouri requires
that all applicants for a general business license be of "good moral charac-
ter." In determining such character, the City License Inspector may con-
sider the applicant's penal, license, and personal background.28
15. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 9500-90 (Vest 1964).
16. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 20-267 to -278a (1969).
17. 7 U.S.C. § 53 (1970).
18. Id. § 51 (b) (1970).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 66, §8 15-27 (1969).
20. Id. ch. 5, §§ 163-87 (1969).
21. CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 11700-21 (West 1960).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 776 (1970).
23. See generally 51 Am. Jur. 2D Licenses and Permits § 107 n.13 (1970), and
cases cited therein.
24. See, e.g., COLUMBU, Mo., REv. OR NANcEs § 11.030 (A) (1964), which
subjects to a tax:
All kinds of vocations, occupations, professions, enterprises, establish-
ments, and all other kinds of activities and matters .... any of which are
conducted for private profits or benefits either directly or indirectly ......
25. Id. § 11.160.
26. Id. § 11.060.
[Vol. 37
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While most authorities contend that the purpose of licensure is to
regulate or tax-or both27-licenses are also used for the purpose of regis-
tration. A registration license raises revenue incidentally, if at all, and it
is not regulatory, since minimal or no requirements or restrictions are put
on the licensee. Two examples are marriage and bicycle licenses; neither
raises any revenue or has any substantial regulatory impact. Instead, licen-
sure is the administrative method used by government to keep a record
of people or bikes.
The main and most important purpose of licensing is regulation, and
it is this purpose that is behind most of the laws requiring the licensing
of individuals engaged in certain occupations. The purpose is achieved
by conditioning the practice of an occupation or profession upon (1) edu-
cation, experience or examination, 28 and (2) responsible performance after
acquisition of the license. Requirements of the first type, in addition to
those of professional competency, may include requirements of citizenship,
residency, good moral character, apprenticeship, or recommendation by
presently licensed individuals. Programs seeking to insure post-licensing
performance requirements typically impose general or specific prohibitions
against certain types of conduct.
The method by which regulation is achieved is dependent to a degree
upon the level of government involved. Municipal governments that use
licenses to regulate occupations usually license through a branch of the
city government.29 The trades regulated by municipalities are normally
those not licensed by the state, since the state usually pre-empts municipal
authority when it licenses. The federal government licenses through agen-
cies operated and staffed by the federal government. At the state level,
however, most of the licensing power is delegated to independent agencies,
which may be administratively consolidated in a state department, but
are controlled by and composed of members of the occupation.3 0 This,
for example, is the technique in Missouri, with only a few exceptions.
The Division of Registration (under the Department of Education) is
composed of 15 different licensing authorities.3 ' Each of these authorities,
which is described either as a "Board" or "Commission," is composed of
and controlled by between three and seven members, appointed by the
Governor and approved by the Senate.32 In practical effect, these boards
are completely independent; they are responsible only to the Governor
27. See 51 AM. JuR. 2D Licenses and Permits § 4 n.7 (1970).
28. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 1, at 7.
29. Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. LAW & EcoN. 93 (1961); Note,
Occupational Licensing: An Argument for Asserting State Control, 44 NOTRE DAM
LAw. 104 (1968).
30. COUNCIL.OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 1, at 28-39.
81. § 161.212, RSMo 1969. This statute only mentions 14 agencies, but the
Board of Nursing Home Administrators is also under the Division of Registration.
See § 844.010, RSMo 1969.
82. For a brief summary of the structure of each board see THE MissonUR
STATE GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES CATALOG 177-97 (June, 1970).
1972.]
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since the Division of Registration has no budget or personnel, and is an
agency on paper only.33 While these 15 independent agencies license occu-
pations, there are several other licensing authorities, both of the occupa-
tional (e.g., insurance brokers and agents) and business (e.g., Public Service
Commission) licensing varieties which are operated, staffed and funded by
the state. A remarkable fact, however, is that the majority of the boards
in Missouri-as in most states34-are operated and controlled by the very
members of the occupation licensed.
C. Why License: The Stated Reason
Protection of the public is the philosophy stated to support licensing
laws.3 5 To obtain a license, the occupational licensee must have the requisite
education, training or experience, and to retain a license he must continue
to meet certain standards of conduct. The argument is that the public is
thereby assured of a minimum level of competence in an occupation, and
the health, safety and welfare of the people are protected.
While this is commendable there are clearly limits to the extension
of protection to the public by occupational licensing. Some state courts
have held that "common" occupations which do not threaten the health,
safety or welfare of the people are not properly subject to the economic
prior restraint of licensing. For example, one occupation that a number
of state courts have held not subject to regulation is the practice of pho-
tography.30 The judicial reasoning appears grounded on the notion that
photography is one of the "ordinary lawful and innocuous occupations of
life [which] must be open to all alike upon the same terms."3 7 The licen-
33. The Department of Education also has no connection with the licensing
agencies. In fact, the author of this article called the Department to find the
address of one agency; no one could provide the information.
34. See, e.g., NEw JERSEY PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING STUDY
COMMISSION, REPORT 20-22 (Jan., 1971).
35. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW 538 (5th ed. 1970). See
also Holmer, The Role and Function of State Licensing Agencies, 40 STATE Gov'T
84, 85 (1967), where the author states:
Obviously, it is a legislative determination that the practice of the profes-
sion, or employment in the occupation is fraught with the public in-
terest. . . . The nature of the public interest is not the same for all
professions however. There are at least three kinds of public interest in-
volved. In some cases, the primary purpose is the protection of the pub-
lic health. In others, it is protection against fraud. In still others, it is
simply a convenient means of assuring the public that a practitioner pos-
sesses certain minimum qualifications. If we recall the definition of licen-
sing as "the administrative lifting of a legislative prohibition," the public
purpose of the process is clearer. We forbid the practice of a profession
until a license has been secured, and we condition the license on ade-
quate preparation and responsible performance.
36. See, e.g., Sullivan v. De Cerb, 156 Fla. 496, 23 So. 2d 571 (1945); Bramley
v. State, 187 Ga. 826, 2 S.E.2d 647 (1939); and State v. Gleason, 128 Mont. 485, 277
P.2d 530 (195-1). Of course, the decline of economic due process might cast some
doubt on the continuing validity of these cases.
37. State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 770, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (1949).
[Vol. 37
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sing of florists, 38 paper hangers3 9 and stone masons40 have also been held
invalid by state courts.
This idea that certain "common" occupations should be available to
all has not halted licensing of more and more occupations. 41 The problem
is that almost every occupation has its irresponsible, unscrupulous or in-
competent individuals (as a person who has had his wedding pictures
ruined by a photographer might attest). Defining a test to determine when
the public needs additional protection beyond that afforded by general
laws becomes difficult, but a usable set of standards is not impossible. The
New Jersey Professional and Occupational Licensing Study Commission
has concluded that an occupation should be licensed (or continue to be
licensed) if, and only if:
The unregulated practice can clearly harm or endanger the health,
safety and welfare of the public and when the potential for such
harm is easily recognizable and not remote or dependent upon
tenuous argument; and,
The public needs, and will benefit by, an assurance of initial and
continuing professional and occupational ability; and,
The public is not effectively protected by other means; and
It can be demonstrated that licensing would be the most appro-
priate form of regulation.42
Unfortunately, no legislature (or court) appears to have taken such an
analytic approach to stem the impetus toward greater licensing.
D. Why License: The Real Reason?
Licenses, whether by design or nature, can create a beneficial economic
situation for the licensee.43 That the members of an occupational group
would desire to be licensed might at first seem incongruous, since it is
hard to understand why any group would want itself under governmental
control. Sometimes groups do not have the desire, and licensing is imposed,
as was the federal licensing of stock exchanges and brokers after the stock
market crash of 1929.44 But the members of the occupation may want
licensing, for several reasons. Economic benefits are surely one of those
reasons, 4 5 and the desire for recognition by others is another, i.e., the mem-
38. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Couzens, 290 Mich. 185, 287 N.W. 427 (1939).
39. Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 A. 534 (1936).
40. Gray v. Omaha, 80 Neb. 526, 114 N.W. 600 (1908).
41. See, e.g., Merrel v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal. 2d 907, 458
P.2d 5, 80 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1969), which upheld the licensing of motor vehicle
dealers and salesmen.
42. REPORT, supra note 34, at 6. Based on this test, the Commission rec-
ommended that New Jersey regulate by licensure only 17 of the 42 occupations
presently licensed in New Jersey. Id.
43. For a discussion of the economic effects of licensing, see Barron, Business
and Professional Licensing-California, A Represenlative Example, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 640 (1966); Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. LAw & ECON. 93 (1961).
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ber wants to be accorded the rank of a specialist or professional,4 6 or he
thinks he is entitled to such recognition.4 7 Naturally, it is not common for
a group to state that it desires licensing in order to achieve economic or
social benefits. 4 8 More often, the stated reason is that licensing will help
protect the public. To quote Gellhorn and Byse:
We lawyers are quick to attack those who invade our monopoly
by engaging in the "unauthorized practice of law." We are con-
cerned for the public at large-aren't we?40
The legislative histories of licensing laws support the premise that
the force behind the typical law is a desire for professional status,50 and
that there is usually no group to oppose the measure publicly. 51 The excep-
tion to this premise occurs when the occupation desiring licensure infringes
upon the powers of a previously licensed group. Thus, the medical pro-
fession in New York strenuously resisted efforts by the chiropractors to
obtain licensed status, but after a diligent effort the chiropractors attained
their goal.5 2 Along the same lines the naturopaths of South Carolina, after
successfully obtaining governmental recognition, made an unsuccessful
attack on the legislature's withdrawal of their status. 53
46. Id. at 107-09. See also Holmer, The Role and Function of State Licensing
Agencies, 40 STATE GOV'T 84 (1967).
47. See Carey & Doherty, State Regulation of Certified Public Accountants,
40 STATE GOVT 26 (1967), where the authors state:
It might be argued with some force that CPAs should be licensed and
regulated under law simply because they are professional men. They have
been educated and trained in a somewhat recondite and intellectual
discipline. Id. at 26.
48. But see S.S. Kresge Co. v. Couzens, 290 Mich. 185, 287 N.W. 427 (1930),
a case involving a city ordinance which required the licensing of florists. A florist
testified: "The object of this ordinance lobbied by my florist committee was to
get rid of those merchants [who] were underselling our association of florists." Id.
at 191, 287 N.W. at 430.
419. W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 539 (5th ed. 1970).
50. See Hanft 9- Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation under Licensing Stat-
utes, 17 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (1938), where the authors state:
Did the man on the street put pressure on his representative in the legis-
lature to protect him from unlicensed chiropodists, tile layers and pho-
tographers?
A former Missouri state senator indicated licensed and unlicensed occupations are
continually bombarding the legislature for more control or licensure status.
Interview with John Downs, in St. Joseph, Mo., Aug. 13, 1971.
51. Future practitioners are the most obvious opponents, but
[t]hose who may in [the] future find themselves excluded from an occu-
pation, or delayed in their entry into it, are not yet aware of the difficulties
they will face; unorganized and, indeed unknown, they remain unrepre-
sented while licensing is debated. Who can present the public's opinion
of whether it will or will not be disadvantaged by recognition of yet an-
other profession or sub-profession? The "public" has no spokesman in
these matters.
W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS AND GOVERNMENAL RESTRAINTS 110-11 (1956).
52. W. GELLIORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 539 (5th ed. 1970), citing
N.Y. Times, April 30, 1963, at 37, col. 1.
53. Dantzler v. Callison, 230 S.C. 75, 94 S.E.2d 177 (1956).
[Vol. 37
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The normal progression of an occupational licensing law also indicates
outside pressures by the "restricted" group.5 4 Licensing laws usually start
out at the certification (or registration) stage, where the practitioner, upon
qualifying, becomes entitled to use a label, e.g.-public accountant. Only
the title, not the profession, is restricted to licensees. Uncertified members
may continue practice, but without the title. The next logical step is to
eliminate all non-certified individuals by compulsory licensing. The group
argues that the public is not being adequately protected because of the
non-registered individuals and that the only solution is a complete prohibi-
tion against the practice or occupation by such unlicensed persons. 55 At
this stage entrance qualifications become more rigid and control over
licensed members more strict.56 An occupation-controlled board usually
attains this control, exercising it through the board's power to issue and
revoke licenses. Since the board in most states is the prosecutor, judge and
jury, a licensee who is involved in a dispute with the board is likely to
lose on questions of disputed fact.57 The result is that the group, if suffi-
ciently powerful, will become almost autonomous.
The severity of restriction on licensed professions has led one author
to suggest that the most restrictive laws are for the benefit of the prac-
titioners while the least restrictive are enacted for the public benefit.6 8
Moreover, it would appear futile to attack the enactment of more restrictive
laws in the absence of an articulate constituency. Those most affected are
either unorganized, or in the case of future practitioners, unknown or un-
aware.
E. Licensing in the Courts: Contemporary Attitudes
Since the right to engage in legitimate employment is recognized as
included within the protection of the due process clause of the Constitu-
tion,59 all licensing laws must be reasonable and "have a 'rational connec-
tion' with fitness to practice the particular vocation or profession. ... -(9
Persons dissatisfied with the imposition of licensure have used these grounds
in the past to attack licensing laws.6 1 Today, the probability that any such
attack will be successful is extremely doubtful.
54. COUNCIL Or STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCmUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION
IN THE STATES 24-27 (1952); Graves, Professional and Occupational Restrictions, 13
TEM. L.Q. 334, 334-36 (1939).
55. See Carey & Doherty, State Regulation of Certified Public Accountants,
40 STATE GOV'T 26 (1967).
56. See W. GELLHOPN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS
114-18 (1956), where the author cites the course of the laws licensing beauty shop
operators in Louisiana as an example of this progression.
57. See text accompanying notes 184-86 infra.
58. See Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. LAW & ECON. 93 (1961).
59. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915). Truax, while not a licensing case, did involve the right to work.
60. Doyle v. Board of Barber Examiners, 219 Cal. App. 2d 504, 510, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 349, 353 (1963). Accord, Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
61. See case cited notes 38-40 supra.
1972.]
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Since the decline of economic due process as a viable doctrine at the
national level, the federal courts have interpreted their role in reviewing
economically related laws narrowly-while simultaneously characterizing
the concept of the public welfare as broad and inclusive.62 The result is
that the courts have been reluctant to strike down licensing statutes, or
regulations based on such statutes, except when a specific constitutional
right has been threatened63 or the law has been patently discriminatory.6 4
The usual attitude was summarized by the Supreme Court when it said:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.05
Law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many
cases. 66
At the state level, the courts have had a relatively free rein to decide
the limits of state legislative power, and have usually had little difficulty
in finding a "rational basis" for licensing laws. 7 However, there are occa.
sional indications of doctrinal limits. For example, the constitutionality of
the requirement of residency for the practice of many professions was
drawn into question recently by the Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thomp-
son.6 8 Perhaps the main justification for residency requirements in licensing
laws is the desire to deter the immigration of professionals. Under the
reasoning of Shapiro, this is constitutionally impermissible as a restraint
on interstate travel, since no compelling state interest is involved. 9
The courts' increasing refusal to review the scope of licensing laws
appears based on the notion that the policy issue is basically political and
62. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502(1934).
63. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), is one example. This case held
that a New York ordinance requiring a license to hold a religious meeting in the
street was invalid because of insufficient standards, thus creating a danger that
freedom of religion would be infringed. See also Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949), where the Court said "states
have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their
internal, commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul
of some specific federal constitutional prohibition .... " Id. at 536.
64. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish 8: Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
65. Lee Optical Co. v. Williamson, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
66. Id. at 487.
67. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of
Law, 53 N.W.U. L. REv. 13, 24 (1958). But see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957),
which invalidated an Illinois law licensing community currency exchanges because
American Express was expressly exempted from the law. Justices Black, Frank-
furter and Harlan dissented, believing there was a rational and reasonable basis
for the law as it was written.
68. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
69. See, e.g., Mo. A-r'y Gm. Op. No. 276, May 22, 1970.
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that the merits of the proposals are more appropriate for evaluation at
the polls-rather than in the courts.70 Unfortunately for the individual
licensee, this is a worthless alternative. Since he is unable to object to the
regulation itself, he must put his basic reliance on administrative pro-
cedural protections established to guarantee that the regulation is properly
administered. However, the vagaries of administrative due process often
make this an uncertain reliance at best.
II. ADMmIsTRATvE PROCEDURAL PROTEMCIONs FOR
THE OCCUPATIONAL LicENSEE
A. Introduction
Where a state has an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) proceed-
ings by an occupational licensing agency to discipline a licensee, or actions
by an individual to compel an examination or the issuance of a license,
are typically, but not necessarily, governed by that act.7 ' While the par-
ticular licensing statute establishes the power of the agency, it usually
specifically refers to the APA for further definition of the procedures to
be followed in exercising these powers. Thus, a licensing board may be
granted the power to promulgate rules, investigate complaints, initiate
prosecutions, hold hearings, and decide appropriate punishments; but,
unless otherwise provided, all such powers are subject to the restrictions
of the APA.
In the last 30 years, an impressive amount of attention has been paid
to the functions and activities of administrative agencies, and to the admin-
istrative procedural process in general. There has been significant move-
ment for change, particularly in the early and mid-1940's, and substantial
procedural reform, on both the state and federal levels, has resulted. While
much attention has been paid to the general area of administrative law,
however, state administrative procedure has been neglected to a surprising
extent-particularly when it is realized that the ordinary person is much
more likely to be affected by a state agency than by a federal agency, and
that most lawyers are consequently more concerned with state, rather than
federal, administrative procedure. 72
Due in no small part to this neglect, state administrative procedural
reform has lagged far behind federal reform. Furthermore, the reforms
that have been achieved are inconsistent in scope and applicability, so that
a crazy-quilt pattern of procedural processes has resulted among the various
states, and within individual states as well. This lack of uniformity, coupled
with the decades of neglect legislators and legal scholars have visited upon
70. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876), cited in Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
71. The state's APA only comes into operation when a hearing is required
by law or constitutional right. See part II, § B of this article. In those states not
having administrative procedure acts, the only restrictions on an agency's power
are those in its enacting statute, and the state and federal constitutions.
72. 1 F. CoorER STATE ADMNisTRA=Ivn LAw 1 (1965).
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state administrative procedure, have to a large extent left its principles
"submerged in a dark-and unexplored morass." 78
State administrative procedural reform has mainly consisted of the
promulgation, by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act (adopted in
1946)74 and the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act (ap-
proved in 1961).75 Both the Model Act and the Revised Act are extremely
important to state administrative procedural protections. They deal, how-
ever, with major principles and not with details, and are based on the
theory that the principles enunciated should govern the entire adminis-
trative structure because "[t]hey are essential safeguards of fairness in
the administrative process" in regard to which "[m]ost state statutes are
altogether deficient .... ,70 It should be emphasized that the principles
embraced represent, in the minds of the drafters, "the irreducible minimum
of basic fairness in the governmental processes of rule-making and admin-
istrative adjudication .... ."77
The major procedural protections established by the Model Act and
Revised Act are, briefly, as follows:
[t]he requirement that each agency adopt essential procedural as
well as substantive rules; that all rule-making be accompanied by
proper notice and opportunity to submit views; that there be
proper assurance of publicity for all administrative rules; that
provision be made for declaratory judgments and rulings; that
there be assurance of fundamental fairness in administrative ad-
judicative hearings, particularly as to notice, rules of evidence,
taking official notice, separation of functions, and the assurance of
personal familiarity with the evidence on the part of responsible
deciding officers; and, finally, that provision be made for adequate
judicial review.78
The foregoing do not represent all of the principles embraced by the
Model Act and the Revised Act. But even among those listed above, only
a few are relevant to the present subject which is that of state occupational
licensing. The basic principles involved in occupational licensing are (1)
the right to a hearing; (2) guarantees that a hearing, after being granted,
will be fairly conducted and lead to a just result, and (8) the right to
effective judicial review. The Model Act79 and the Revised Act are good
73. Cooper, Turning the Spotlight on State Administrative Procedure, 49
A.B.A.J. 29, 30 (1963).
74. Hereinafter cited as MODEL Acr. A model act (as opposed to a uniform
act) is adopted when uniformity is not necessary or desirable. For an analysis of
the Model Act, see Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 53
IowA L. Rav. 196, 199 (1948).
75. Hereinafter cited as Rrvisn_) Acr.
76. 9C U.L.A. 177 (1967).
77. Stason, supra note 74, at 201 (emphasis added).
78. 1 F. CooPER, supra note 72, at 13.
79. Missouri's APA is substantially the Model Act, but there are differences
between the two. Some of these differences will be noted.
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models for analysis here, despite the fact that these two acts have been
formally adopted in only ten states. They have, however, had a significant
effect upon legislation in many other states.8 0 This includes Missouri, for
the Missouri APA is similar to the Model Act and to a large extent pat-
terned after it.
B. The Right to a Hearing and the
Right Privilege Doctrine
The right to a hearing is, of course, the most basic procedural protec-
tion for the licensee. Without this right the licensee cannot rebut the
charges against him or establish his own case. That licensees have been
in the past and still are today occasionally denied this right is somewhat
alarming, considering the emphasis procedural due process has received
in the last decade. The reason for such denials is the anomaly termed the
right-privilege doctrine. To the licensee the question of whether his govern-
mental permission is a right or a privilege can determine the procedural
protections he will receive. If it is the former, the licensee is entitled to
procedural benefits of notice and hearing. He is entitled to his license,
and can compel its issuance, if he meets the reasonable requirements set
out in the statute. But if the license is characterized as a privilege, the
person is entitled to nothing; the licensee is denied a hearing because no
right is denied by the agency's action. Since there is no right, due process
is not violated by a denial. The whim of the state controls the individual's
existence as a licensee.
While licensing as a widespread method of government regulation is
relatively new, the term itself is of common law origin. At common law
it was defined as a "permission or right given by some competent authority
to do an act, which without such authority, would be illegal, or a tort or
trespass."sl It was a real property concept, and it was a true privilege,
since without the license the person would be acting illegally. The license
granted no estate or interest in the land and, therefore, revocation could
be made at will.82
When occupational licensing began, the common law definition was
attached to this new use of the term "license." This was unfortunate since
the courts failed to realize that the situations were not parallel and that
the old use of the term might be inapplicable to governmental regula-
tion.8 3
80. The Model Act has been substantially adopted by eight states (including
Missouri) and the Revised Act has been substantially adopted by three states.
9C U.LA. 136 (1967).
81. Bouvmris' LAv DianoNARY 1974 (1914).
82. Rouse v. Roy L. Houck Sons' Corp., 249 Oreg. 655, 439 P.2d 856 (1968);
Joseph v. Sheriffs' Ass'n, 480 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1968). See 2 A.cICA LA-w oF
PROPERTY §§ 8.109-.110, 8.112 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); RESrAT_=EMNT OF PROPERTY
§§ 512, 519 (1944).
83. See Barnett, Public Licenses and Private Rights, 33 ORE. L. REv. 1, 4
(1953), where the author suggests that the problem is entirely one of connotation:
"If the noncommital term 'certificate' had been used instead of the term 'license',
the course of history might have been very different."
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The first incongruity between the two situations is that licenses at com-
mon law were private in character. An owner of land was the only one
who could grant the license and he did so at his pleasure, thereby making
it a privilege. But occupational licenses are granted by the government (of
which we are all owners) and, while the label may be the same, there "is
no reason for applying the relationship of private law to an area of public
law [where the] facts do not fit."84
The second problem is that while real property licenses were authoriza-
tions to do something illegal at common law, the occupations licensed
today by federal, state or local governments were, by and large, "legal"
at common law.8 5 An occupational license, therefore, grants permission
to carry on an activity, in its nature lawful, but prohibited by statute or
ordinance. The occupation is licensed in the interest of public welfare,
but the license is merely a "permission to exercise a pre-existing right or
privilege."86 When the legislature declares the activity illegal, the pre-
existing rights are transformed into a privilege, but it is a privilege only
to the extent that everyone is not granted a license.8 7
Many courts, however, have not recognized these incongruities. The
resulting reasoning of these courts is usually similar to the following:
[T]he very fact that a license is granted to a person would seem
to imply that the person granting the license can also revoke it.
The license is nothing but a permission, and if one gives a man
permission to do something, it is natural that the person who
gives the permission will be able to withdraw the permission.88
Fortunately, the courts have not automatically assumed that all licensed
occupations exist at the pleasure of the authorities. The fact that they still
do deny the right to a hearing to some licensees is hard to understand
since as early as 1926, in Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Ap-
peals,SO the Supreme Court decided that an aggrieved applicant for an
occupational license did indeed have such a right. Though the Court's
statement that the licensee must be given "an opportunity by notice for
hearing and answer"90 was dictum, it was made "quite dear that due process
entitles the applicant to a chance to rebut and explain the evidence against
him."9 1
The federal courts have consistently followed this view and have re-
quired that a trial-type hearing be granted when a license is denied, not
84. Davis, Must a Licensing Authority Act Judicially, NFw ZALAND L.J.
360, 363 (Dec. 18, 1956).
85. "That is just why licenses are required-to restrict the liberty in activities
already existing at common law." Barnett, supra note 83, at 5-6.
86. Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 255, 72 N.E. 2d
697, 699 (1947).
87. Barnett, supra note 83, at 5.
88. Ex parte Parker, [19531 1 W.L.R. 1150, 1154 (Q.B.).
89. 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
90. Id. at 123.
91. 1 K. DAvis, ADmaNmuA= Lw 494 (1959).
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renewed, suspended, or revoked, on the basis of issues of adjudicative fact.92
No hearing is required when the facts in dispute are not adjudicative;
however, in this situation there is usually no real need for a hearing, and
a hearing would probably not be the best method of resolving the dispute.
93
The denial of a trial-type hearing, when adjudicative facts are involved,
would, on the basis of Goldsmith, appear to be a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution. Yet there is a significant body of case
law at the state level which denies such an opportunity to be heard on
the basis of the right-privilege doctrine.
Usually the courts consider the characteristics of the activity in deter-
mining whether it is a right or privilege. If the activity is of a non-bene-
ficial nature and could be prohibited completely, the court concludes that
it is a privilege and then takes the illogical step of assuming that the in-
dividual is not entitled to judicial or procedural protection. The step
is illogical because the state has not prohibited the activity-yet the court
is singling out an individual and treating him as if the activity had been
prohibited. 94
It is hard to take the privilege doctrine seriously, both (1) because it
has been increasingly criticized as unsound, and (2) because it usually
appears as dictum, rather than the basis of the holding in a case. 95 Also,
the decision denying a hearing is a sound one in many cases, even though
the privilege doctrine may be invoked. 96 However, in spite of the long
and frequent criticism of the doctrine, and its rejection in federal licensing
cases, there are still occasional state cases which use it to justify denial of a
hearing when disputed facts are involved.97
Fortunately, this heresy has been finally noticed by the federal courts
in actions against state agencies. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Hornsby v. Allen,9 8 a 42 U.S.C. section 1988 case, held that an applicant
for a liquor license was entitled to due process of law in connection with
her application, and that this in turn, requires (1) ascertainable standards
and (2) a hearing to determine whether these standards have been met.
The court rejected the privilege argument completely.
Since liquor licensees are engaged in one of the professions most often
considered privileged, this decision had far reaching implications; yet the
Iowa Supreme Court in Smith v. Iowa Liquor Control Commission99 later
held that the question of whether the legislature could provide for revoca-
92. Id. at 493.
93. Id. at 494.
94. Comment, The Use and Misuse of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Li-
cense Revocation: What's so Hot About Cosmetology School?, 31 U. Cma. L. Rnv.
577 (1964).
95. F. CoormR, ADmais-mrv AGENCIEs AND TE CorRTs 78-79 (1951).
96. 1 K. DAvis, supra note 91, at 502.
97. Id. at 502-03. See Fink v. Cole, 1 N.Y.2d 48, 133 N.E.2d 691, 150 N.Y.S.2d
175 (1956), and Michael v. Town of Logan, 247 Iowa 574, 73 N.W.2d 714 (1955).
98. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
99. 169 N.W.2d 803 (1969).
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tion of a liquor license without notice or hearing was "hardly debatable."' 100
In the light of state decisions of this sort, the only effective remedy appears
to be an action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. section 1988, as the plaintiff
in Hornsby did.
The Supreme Court cases of Goldberg v. Kelly' 0 ' and Bell v. Burson'0 2
also indicate that the privilege anomaly is not long for this world. While
the issue in Goldberg was the necessity of an evidentiary hearing before
termination of welfare benefits, the language of the Court was considerably
broader in scope. The Court said:
Termination [of benefits] involves state action that adjudicates
important rights. The constitutional challenge cannot be answered
by an argument that public assistance benefits are "a 'privilege'
and not a 'right."' ... The extent to which procedural due process
must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which
he may be "comdemned to suffer grievous loss," and depends upon
whether the recipient's interest in avoiding the loss outweighs the
governmental interest in summary adjudication.1 03
The Court went on to say that the "crucial" factor was whether the termina-
tion deprives "an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live
while he waits." Such a test seems applicable to occupational licensing, since
the licensee may be denied the right to make a living and thus suffer
grievous loss.' 04
The Supreme Court also discounted the right-privilege distinction in
Bell v. Burson, a case which involved the suspension of a driver's license
under Georgia's Safety Responsibility Act. The Court, in holding that a
driver was entitled to a hearing on the issue of liability before his license
could be suspended, said:
[D]ue process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an
interest such as that here involved it must afford "notice and op-
portunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case" before
the termination becomes effective.' 05
If notice and hearing must be provided before a driver's license can
be suspended, can there be any doubt that the same rights apply to an
occupational licensee?
Administrative procedure acts have offered little help in eliminating
the right-privilege doctrine. The Model Act, and Missouri's APA, con-
100. Id. at 807.
101. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
102. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
103. 397 U.S. at 262-63 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 264.
105. 402 U.S. at 542. For further information on the status of the right-
privilege doctrine, see generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HiARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Barnett, Public
Licenses and Private Rights, 33 ORE. L. REv. 1 (1953); Reich, Individual Rights
and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich,
The New Property, 73 YAL L.J. 733 (1964); Note, 44 TExAs L. REv. 1360 (1966).
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tribute little to guaranteeing a right for a hearing when adjudicative facts
are involved. They seem concerned with basic principles that apply when
a right to a hearing exists, rather than to enunciating principles which
actually bring this right into existence. In fact, the reasoning of the Model
and Missouri Acts can appear almost circular; the procedural protections
they offer apply mainly to a "contested case," which is defined in the
Model Act as:
a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or
privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional
right to be determined after an agency hearing.1 06
This sounds very much like saying that a party is entitled to a hearing
when he has a contested case, and has a contested case when he is entitled
to a hearing.107 It would seem that a better definition of "contested case"
would have been desirable, and the Revised Act has moved in this direc-
tion. It specifically lists licensing as included in the term "contested case,"
and defines licensing as including "the agency process respecting the grant,
denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, or amend-
ment of a license."1 08 Only licenses "required solely for revenue purposes"
seem to be outside of the definition.1 0 9
The requirement of the Model Act and the Revised Act that all parties
are to be granted a hearing in a contested case also appears in the statute
law of many states; without a dear definition as to what is and is not a
contested case, however, this basic requirement adds little to procedural
due process."10 Thus, by specifically putting licensing cases under the pro-
cedural requirement of a hearing, the Revised Act has made a significant
advancement.
In spite of the deficiencies of the Model Act's definition of "contested
case" and the failure of the privilege doctrine to pass completely out of the
picture, it can generally be said that, in the occupational licensing area,
when adjudicative facts are involved, a hearing is today a requirement
and will be granted. This may result from a statute, from a state court's
construction of the requirements of procedural due process, or from a
section 1983 action, as in Hornsby v. Allen. In each instance, however, the
result is the same: an occupational licensee who deserves to be heard will
rarely be denied a hearing.
106. MoDE. Acr § 1 (3). The Missouri provision, § 536.010 (3), RSMo 1969,
is the same with the exception that "statute" is used in place of "law or constitu-
tional right." This implies that a court could not read the requirement for a hear-
ing into a statute. The point has never been raised.
107. The Missouri courts have thus interpreted this provision to mean that
there is a "contested case" only when the state constitution, a statute, or municipal
ordinance requires the agency to hold a hearing. See, e.g., Kopper Kettle Restau-
rants, Inc. v. City of St. Robert, 439 S.W.2d 1 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969), noted in 36
Mo. L. R.v. 444 (1971).
108. R visE- AcT § 1 (4), 14.
109. Id. § 1 (3).
110. 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADiminSmArivE LAw 287 (1965).
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C. A Fair Hearing?
It is an empty protection to be entitled to a hearing if there are no
concurrent guarantees that the hearing will be fairly conducted. Many
elements, naturally, are involved in the world "fair." But it would seem
that, for a hearing to be fair, three elements are at least essential to the
aggrieved party: (1) adequate notice of the charges against him; (2) suf-
ficient procedural guarantees as to the conduct of the hearing, such as fair
rules of evidence and the right to cross-examine opposing witnesses; and
(3) an impartial deciding officer or board.
1. Notice
The Model Act is vague as to the requirements for notice; "reasonable
notice," along with specificity as to the "time, place, and issues involved,"
is all that is required."' The Missouri APA, while initially only requiring
"reasonable notice,"" 2 now requires notice to include "a brief statement
of the matter involved in the case unless a copy of the -writing accompanies
said notice."' 1 3 The Revised Act also goes further than the Model Act,
especially in its requirement of reference to the rules and statutes involved
and "a short and plain statement of the matters asserted.""14 If there is
no statute stating so, it is not necessarily required that the nature of the
hearing be stated in the notice. Thus, a mere requirement that the issues
be stated-as contained in the Model Act-may not adequately advise the
party of the nature of the proceedings." 15
At least 23 states have general legislation on the subject of pleadings
and notice for agency hearings."16 Most follow the Model Act and require
that the issues be stated; only six appear to require that the nature of the
hearing be stated in the notice." 7 As can be seen, approximately half of
the states do not appear to meet (statutorily) the minimum requirements
of the Model Act, even though specification of issues "is one of the basic
elements of fair procedure.""x 8 Missouri's APA does meet this standard,
and, in addition, many of the licensing statutes in use before 1965 also
provided for adequate notice." 9
An additional, though rarely recognized problem, is that even if ade-
quate notice is given the licensee may not realize the import of the notice.
Whereas, the form of notice in judicial proceedings (e.g., a petition or
subpoena) makes it dear to the person that he is involved in a potentially
111. MODEL AcT § 8.
112. See § 536.060 (1), RSMo 1949.
113. § 536.067 (2), RSMo 1969. This provision was added in 1957.
114. REmvsED Acr § 9.
115. 1 F. COOPER, Supra note 110, at 278-79.
116. Comment, Administrative Procedure Legislation Among the States, 49
CORNELL L.Q. 634, 643 (1964).
117. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 110, at 279.
118. R. BENjf aN, ADMNISATIVxE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK
77 (1942).
119. § 335.170, RSMo 1969. This section was impliedly repealed by the AHC
statute. See APPENDix No. 1, § 11.
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serious legal matter, the notice of the administrative hearing may just
inform the licensee that he is to appear before an agency composed of
fellow practitioners whom he may personally know. For example, the notice
might be in letter form, which may not make the licensee sufficiently
aware of the potential legal implications so as to recognize the need for an
attorney.
Although the basic right to be given adequate notice of the charges
against him seems beyond question today, many state agencies tend to
wait until the hearing itself before fully acquainting the party with the
facts of the case. In fact, there are indications in many cases that the agency
itself may not be aware of the facts at the time of giving initial notice.120
The Revised Act insures that a party will learn the particulars of his case
before the hearing. This would seem a basic element of procedural fair-
ness. There have been a considerable number of licensing cases which
have been set aside by state courts because the notice given the affected
party was not adequate to inform him of the charges against him.121
Because of their number, in fact, it can be said that in a great many of
the states which have not legislated in this area, a party is still entitled to
the notice provided for in the Model Act, as part of the procedural due
process requirement.
2. Conduct of the Hearing
Once a party has attained proper notice of the hearing, and is adequate-
ly informed of the charges against him, there remains the question of
whether the hearing will be fairly conducted. For a truly fair hearing,
a party needs the protection of certain evidentiary rules, the right to con-
front and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and an impartial trier
of fact.
a. Evidence
Evidentiary rules in administrative proceedings create a difficult prob-
lem, for a delicate balance between competing interests must be met.
Guidelines are certainly needed to protect both the party and the agency
from the agency's possible ignorance of legal principle, yet agency expertise
can often best be put to advantage when there is a degree of flexibility and
informality available to meet the exigencies of a particular situation. 22
Since these interests can conflict, there has been a general relaxation of
evidentiary rules in the administrative process without the loss of concern
over possible violations of basic elements of due process.' 2 3
The Model Act's approach is that "agencies may admit and give proba-
tive effect to evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted
by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." 124 Also, "in-
120. 1 F. CooRr, supra note 110, at 283.
121. Id. at 285-86.
122. Comment, supra note 116.
123. Id.
124. MODEL Acr § 9 (1). The comparable Missouri provision is § 536.070, RSMo
1969. The only provision of this section relating to the admissibility of evidence
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competent, irrelevent, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence" may
be excluded. 12 5 This standard is considerably less rigorous than the com-
mon law rules of evidence, but certainly does not admit everything that
the "whim and fancy of counsel may offer." 126 Most notably, it allows
admission of hearsay evidence-although it requires such evidence to be
of greater credibility than "mere rumor."'127 The most frequent form of
hearsay found in administrative proceedings are affidavits. Affidavits can
be quite helpful, particularly in expediting a hearing, and are admissible
under the Model Act if not objected to on the ground of inability to
cross-examine. 128
The Revised Act makes a significant departure in this area, but the
departure may actually be a great leap backward. This act provides that
"the rules of evidence as applied in [non-jury] civil cases in the [District
Courts of this state] shall be followed."'129 It does, however, provide that
when it is necessary to ascertain facts not easily susceptible to proof under
these rules, evidence of the type "commonly relied upon by reasonably
prudent men in the conduct of their affairs" is admissible.13 9 Irrelevant,
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence is mandatorily excluded.131
Neither one of the two major changes seems that advisable. In the
first instance, no one really seems to know what the rules of evidence in
non-jury cases are.182 For a layman, the problems are only increased when
it comes to a decision on what evidence to admit. The problem is further
compounded by making exclusion of "irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious evidence" mandatory.183 Experienced judges often have trouble
in making distinctions in this area. The provisions of the Model Act would
seem far more realistic, when the nature of an agency hearing is considered
along with the adavntages of having a degree of informality and flexibility.
These countervailing factors seem to outweigh the admittedly desirable
is subsection 7, which allows the exclusion of "wholly irrelevant, repetitious, privi-
leged or unduly long" evidence. This section does not mention "competent" evi-
dence, but § 536.140 (2) (3), RSMo 1969, does require that the decision of the
agency be based on "competent" evidence. The result is that under both the
Missouri and Model Acts the rules of evidence as applied in civil actions are in
effect. In Missouri, even if an objection to incompetent evidence is made and
sustained, the evidence shall "nevertheless be heard and preserved in the rec-
ord ... ." § 536.070 (7), RSMo 1969.
125. MODEL Aar § 9 (1).
126. Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IowA L. Rxv.
196, 205 (1948).
127. Id.
128. Harris, Administrative Practice and Procedure: Comparative State Legis-
lation, 6 OKLA. L. Rv. 29, 48 (1953). Section 536.070(12), RSMo 1969, provides
that there must be a specific objection to the use of an affidavit.
129. RnvisrD Aar § 10 (1).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Dakin, The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Critique
and Commentary, 25 LA. L. Rnv. 799, 809-10 (1965).
133. Id. at 809.
[Vol. 37
21
et al.: Fair Treatment for the Licensed
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING COMMISSION
theory behind the provisions of the Revised Act-that it is advantageous
to have uniform rules of evidence in all adjudications within a state.18 4
Apparently, only 22 states have legislated in this area; nine of them
basically follow the theory of the Model Act, three follow the Revised Act,
and two follow varying theories of their own.1S5 However, in spite of the
many differences among states as to admissibility of evidence, all that have
legislated in the area allow the admission of evidence which is "incompetent
under strict rules of evidence so long as it has some probative value."18 6
This includes Missouri. 8 7
b. Confrontation and Cross-examination
Admission of hearsay evidence, within certain guidelines, would seem
desirable. It would only be undesirable if the aggrieved party never had
a right to confront and cross-examine the witness against him. The Model
Act gives the right to cross-examine the witnesses who testify, and the right
to submit rebuttal evidence.18  The Revised Act drops the "testify" and
"rebuttal" provisions, and provides that "a party may conduct cross-
examinations required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." 8 9 This
seems to be a well-balanced provision, for the right to cross-examine could
be pushed so far that it would collide with the interest in allowing agencies
to admit hearsay evidence in certain situations. 140 This would "interfere
unnecessarily with the efficient conduct of the work of many agencies."'141
At least 25 states have legislated and, as usual, there is great variance.' 42
Eight states reflect the general theory of the Revised Act-that cross-exami-
nation is desirable but may be waived, when it is not necessary for full
disclosure of the facts.' 43 About seven others follow the Model Act theory
of guaranteeing the right to cross-examine the witnesses who testify. The
remainder offer varying guarantees which extend further than those offered
by either Act.144 Missouri falls into the latter category; section 536.070 (2)
RSMo 1969, provides that
(2) Each party shall have the right to call and examine witnesses,
to introduce exhibits, to cross-examine opposing witnesses on
any matter relevant to the issues even though that matter was
not the subject of the direct examination, to impeach any
witness regardless of which party first called him to testify, and
to rebut the evidence against him.
134. Comment, supra note 116.
135. Id. at 644-45.
186. Id. at 645.
137. See note 124 supra.
138. MODEL Aar § 9 (3).
139. R=sm Acr § 10 (3).
140. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 110, at 372.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 373.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 373-74.
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(3) A party who does not testify in his own behalf may be called
and examined as if under cross-examination.
The varying standards of the states illustrate the difficulty in reaching
a balance between avoiding impairment of agency effectiveness, and insur-
ing that the right to a fair hearing is not infringed.145 It is difficult to say
when due process requires the right to cross-examine to be granted, and
when rebuttal evidence alone is sufficient. 146 Generally, state courts have
held that cross-examination is necessary when there is good reason to be-
lieve that its denial might impede the truth, and several decisions have
held that the right to cross-examine should be granted when witnesses
actually testify.147 When a letter, affidavit or report is admitted into evi-
dence, however, the courts usually compromise on cross-examination, and
grant it only when it is necessary "for a full and true disclosure of the
facts."1 4 8
c. Unbiased Determination
All the procedural protections a licensee may possess can be rendered
valueless if he is not adequately protected against bias on the part of the
trier of fact. In spite of the danger of bias, however, few states have acted
adequately to guard against it.
It is surprising that neither the Model Act nor the Revised Act pro-
poses a separation of the adjudicative and the investigative functions of an
agency. The Revised Act does in some ways appear to support the concept,
by its provision against ex parte consultation between deciding officers and
parties, 49 but this provision seems of lesser value in the occupational
licensing field, where the trier of fact often constitutes the whole board or
agency. The problem of the agency being investigator, prosecutor, judge
and jury all in one is very severe in the area of occupational licensing, and
the dangers in this can hardly be ignored.
The most obvious danger is the conflicts of interest involved. This
combination of duties "violates the ancient tenet of Anglo-American justice
that 'no man shall be a judge in his own cause.' "150 The desire of admin-
istrative tribunals to advance and enforce public policy as they see it, stands
in the way of objective evaluation of evidence; their convictions and ex-
perience allow them to find claims clearly established, when a disinterested
judge would be in doubt.' 5 ' Individuals who must make and enforce the
rules simply should not be allowed to determine whether a violation of these
rules has been established. 5 2 Making the problem worse is the fact that
145. Id. at 372.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 374.
148. Id. at 375.
149. REvISED Acr § 13; Comment, supra note 116.
150. In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 574, 86 A.2d 430, 435 (App. Div. 1952)(concurring opinion of Brennan, J.).
151. F. CooPER, ADmiNismrTVr AGENCIS AND Tm CouRTs 155 (1951).
152. Id. at 157.
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few legislatures have provided much guidance or supervision as to licensing
policy, but rather, have granted agencies broad discretion and "vague
criteria for assessing conduct .... .,"13 This results in little predictability
of application, and unfair results which are beyond correction by judicial
review, because of the broad discretionary power granted the agency.15 4
The makeup of the agency often further adds to the danger of a
biased result. While the aegncy itself may have a conflict of interest in
its prosecution of the case, the individual members of the agency often
have a conflict of interest as to public policy. As mentioned before, mem-
bers of licensing boards are typically drawn from the profession to be
regulated. A good example would be state boards of nursing; in 44 states
(including Missouri), members of these boards are made up entirely "from
nominees of the state nursing associations."'155 It is "not thought proper
to select those who regulate public utilities from nominees of the utility
companies, or an insurance commissioner from nominees of the insurance
companies," yet this is standard procedure in the occupational licensing
area.' 56 Because of this, licensing boards often do not represent a cross-
section of the profession they are regulating. Instead, the representation is
often confined to the element of the profession that is politically domi-
nant. 57 This can orient the members of an agency towards private profes-
sional goals, rather than public policy or public interest.158 Aware of this,
and faced with an expensive and possibly damaging suit, the licensee is
often forced to submit to agency demands of questionable validity, either
by modifying or withdrawing his suit, or accepting a license under imposed
conditions.159
Unfortunately, the problem of bias has often been overlooked in dis-
cussions of needed improvements in administrative procedure. Many seem
to feel that the right of appeal and review somehow deemphasizes the
seriousness of the problem; a party will be protected simply by requiring
that the decision be properly supported by the record.' 60 But, judicial
review is often not an adequate protection.
D. Judicial Review
Statutory provisions covering judicial review of actions by or against
licensees are relatively simple. The only important provisions are those
covering the prerequisites for appeal, the scope of review, and the relief
that can be granted.
153. Dean, The Opportunity to be Heard in the Professional Licensing Process
in Pennsylvania, 67 DicK. L. Rnv. 31, 34 (1962).
154. Id. See also pt. II, § D of this artide.
155. Holmer, The Role and Function of State Licensing Agencies, 40 STATE
GOv'T 34, 35 (1967).
156. Id.
157. Dean, supra note 153, at 37.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 39-40.
160. Gerber, The Act as Viewed by an Administrator, 16 AD. L. REv. 54, 56(1963).
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Review provisions obviously apply only to the licensee, since the board
is the trier of fact, and would not dismiss an action and then appeal that
same dismissal. The licensee may appeal if he "is aggrieved by a final de-
cision in a contested case."''1 He must first exhaust his remedies; but
under licensing statutes, his only remedy is the hearing. The aggrievement
and final order requirements also must be satisfied. But these prerequisites
rarely, if ever, pose problems.
The scope of review is the most important aspect to the licensee. The
injuiry or review is based on the record,162 and may extend to a deter-
mination of whether the action of the agency
(1) Is in violation of constitutional provisions;
(2) Is in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
agency;
(3) Is unsupported by competent and substantial evidence upon
the whole record;
(4) Is, for any other reason, unauthorized by law;
(5) Is made upon unlawful procedure or without a fair trial;
(6) Is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable;
(7) Involves an abuse of discretion.1
The broadest of these provisions is the requirement under both the
Missouri Act (quoted above) and the Model Act, that the agency's decision
be based on "competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record."
The parallel but less exacting provision under the Revised Act is the
"clearly erroneous" test. Unfortunately, if the agency has made a con-
certed effort to base its decision on the record, the licensee has little chance
of prevailing under either test, since "the court shall not substitute its
discretion for discretion legally vested in the agency."'164 The licensee's
best chance for reversal is on questions of law, since the court will weigh
the evidence for itself.' 65 Unfortunately, however, the disputed questions
are rarely of law.
These review provisions do not really aid the licensee; they assume
that the licensee has been provided a fair hearing. However, another alter-
native has developed for the licensee on the federal level-that of a 42
U.S.C. section 1983 action. Two lines of attack have developed from these
actions. First, Hornsby v. Allen, and more recent cases, have established the
principle that a licensing agency must use ascertainable standards in issuing
or denying a license. 166 While these cases have marked a significant break-
161. § 536.100, RSMo 1969.
162. MoDEL Acr § 12 (4); R.vrsE Acr § 15 (d); § 536.130, RSMo 1969.
163. § 536.140(2), RSMo 1969. Section 12(7) of the Model Act is similar.
Section 15 (g) of the Revised Act is also similar, except for the important sub-
stitution of the "dearly erroneous" test for the "whole record" test.
164. § 536.140 (5), RSMo 1969.
165. See § 536.140 (3), RSMo 1969.
166. See, e.g., Turner v. Thompson, 421 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 937 (1970); Barnes v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967). In the former
case the court held that the denial was properly based on ascertainable standards.
In the latter case the court held that there were no ascertainable standards.
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through in allowing federal intervention in state licensing, their effect is
severely limited in application. Since once ascertainable standards are
present, as they usually are in licensing statutes, no claim arises under
section 1983, unless the standards are applied in an unconstitutional man-
ner,1 67 or are unconstitutional on their face. 168
The second line of attack has far-reaching implications for the occu-
pational licensee. A 1969 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Mack v.
Florida State Board of Dentistry,69 considered the due process requirements
of a fair hearing. The plaintiff, a dentist, alleged that the defendant had
not maintained a separation of functions in the investigatory, accusatorial,
prosecutorial and deliberative phases of its proceedings involving him, and
thus, had denied him due process of law.'7 0 The district court held that the
following violated the constitutional concept of fundamental fairness:
(1) The adjudicator of fact being kept appraised of the facts of
the investigation prior to hearing;
(2) The adjudicator of fact having the authority to file the accusa-
tion;
(3) The legal advisor to the adjudication making legal decisions
for the adjudicator of facts and acting as prosecutor as well;
(4) Only the prosecutor and not the defense counsel [being] pres-
ent at the deliberative sessions of the adjudicator;
(5) The executive Secretary in charge of the investigation [being]
present during the deliberative sessions. 17 '
The lower court answered plaintiff's prayer, and ordered defendant to
hold a new hearing following the fourteenth amendment requirements of
due process, as spelled out by the courts, or to grant plaintiff a license. 172
The court of appeals modified the lower court's ruling,173 and avoided
the allegations of procedural defects by holding that the plaintiff had had
no hearing because it was presided over in an inept manner, that counsel
for both sides were disruptive and unrestrained, and the rules of evidence
were inadequately applied.' 74 In so holding, the court stated that a licensee
who is about to lose a professional license, which he has held for 20 years,
is entitled to develop his defense free from events such as those that took
place in the case.'75 The court also suggested that a lawyer, or someone
with legal experience, should preside at the hearing.176
167. See e.g., All v. State Athletic Comm'n, 316 F .Supp. 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
where ascertainable standards were present but were applied in such a manner
as to deny plaintiff equal protection of the law.
168. See, e.g., White v. City of Evansville, 310 F. Supp. 569 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
169. 296 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D. Fla. 1969), modified, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
170. Id. at 1261.
171. Id. at 1263.
172. Id. at 1264.
173. If the ruling had not been so modified the district court's decision would
have invalidated almost every state's procedure for handling licensing disputes.
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The Mack court went a long way in emphasizing that due process in
substance, and not just in form, must be provided to a licensee. Even so,
judicial review, whether federal or state, is normally not a sufficient pro-
tection against licensing board irregularities because of several factors,
among them: (1) the agency discretion may be so broad that an unfair
decision will be properly supported by the record; (2) the party very often
is not represented by counsel, and may not be aware of his rights as to
judicial review; (8) despite a victory, the fact of a dispute may be damaging
to his reputation; (4) agency bias (which leads to distrust and lack of
confidence in state government) is not really reviewable; and (5) resorting
to judicial review may be costly and time-consuming-not to mention, less
than rewarding.1 77
Considerations of good government and an overloaded court system
demand that a fair result be reached by the hearing, rather than through
judicial review. Apart from the overwhelming need for comprehensive
administrative procedure legislation in those states which have yet to adopt
it, it is suggested that the most pressing need in state administrative law
today is a provision for the separation of functions between investigative
and adjudicative responsibilities in administrative proceedings. Of all the
states, it is suggested that Missouri, in the field of occupational licensing,
has taken a significant step in this direction.
III. THE ADmISTRATIV HEA=IG COMMISSION-
ALTERNATIV OR ANSWER?
A. Introduction
The first part of this article attempted to stretch a broad overview of
occupational licensing. The second part of the article concerned itself
with general procedural protections that are available, or should be avail-
able, to the occupational licensee, who is aggrieved by agency action at
the state level. It has been stated that such a licensee, to be properly pro-
tected, needs three broad protections: (1) a guarantee to a hearing; (2) a
guarantee that the hearing, after being granted, will be fairly conducted,
and lead to a just result; and (3) the right to effective judicial review.
As has been pointed out, most states are deficient in offering these
protections, in one or more respects. Before 1965, Missouri would certainly
have had to have been included as one of those states. In 1965, however,
the Missouri General Assembly created the Administrative Hearing Com-
mission (AHC), a new concept in state occupational licensing procedure.
The AHC's express purpose was "to accomplish a fair and impartial hearing
in an orderly, prompt and judicial manner."'178
The main purpose in this third section is to analyze the AHC in
177. For a classic example of this, see Kopper Kettle Restaurants, Inc. v. City
of St. Robert, 439 S.W.2d 1 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969), noted in 36 Mo. L. REv. 444(1971).
178. See the AHC rules and preamble in APPNDIX No. 2.
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order to determine whether it has been a success or a failure in alleviating
deficiencies in state occupational licensing procedure. This analysis of
the AHC has two additional, although subsidiary, goals. The first is to
point out weaknesses in the AHC's structure and functions, in the hope
that both the General Assembly, and the parties involved with the AHC
can work to overcome them. The second is to outline particular problems
any state is bound to encounter in implementing a similar system, and to
suggest means of dealing with such problems.
The material in this section is based largely on the results of empirical
research conducted during the summer and fall of 1971, with the aid of an
American Bar Foundation grant. The research was aimed at obtaining in-
formation from two broad sources. In the first group were the agencies
and individuals that have been functionally related to the AHC, both in
the past and present. This source included drafters of the statute, legis-
lators, commissioners of the AHC, the agencies (including board members
and attorneys), licensees and attorneys for licensees. These sources were
reached by conducting numerous interviews, and through frequent cor-
respondence. A cross section of each group was consulted for its views
and opinions on all aspects of the AHC. The other source was the case
files of the AHC. The history of each of the 204 cases1 79 that the AHC
has handled was researched to obtain empirical data for analysis. Un-
fortunately, an additional source of information-agency files of revoca-
tion actions before 1965-was unavailable. 8 0 The absence of such pre-AHC
data foreclosed a major research goal, namely an empirical comparison of
pre-AHC procedures with those followed since 1965.
B. The "Creation" of the AHC
1. The Moving Forces
An attempt by a legislature to reduce or eliminate the powers of an
administrative body seems fated to run into substantial opposition. The
reason for this opposition lies, quite frankly, in the fact that the agency,
its members and its "friends" have vested interests in maintaining the
status quo.1 8 ' When confronted with a reform proposal, the agency may
contend that it is more skilled and knowledgeable with respect to its juris-
diction, and that any change will limit its continued effectiveness to control
its subjects. The sponsors of Senate Bill 284, which established the AHC,
met such opposition, and were able to overcome it only because of strong
public support and individual hard work.
The real origin of the concept of the AHC goes back several years
before 1965. As early as 1962, members of the Missouri Attorney General's
179. Except as otherwise noted, this analysis is based on data as of Septem-
ber 1, 1971, at which time the empirical research ended.
180. The agencies are usually only required to keep records for two or three
years. See, e.g., § 334.100, RSMo 1969.
181. See, e.g., Kansas City Times, Nov. 15, 1971, at 9C, col. 1, where an editorial
stated: "[E]xisting agencies have their own supportors and [sic] prepared to fight
to preserve their pockets of power."
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office had expressed dissatisfaction with the procedures used in occupa-
tional licensing cases.182 Despite minor variations among the various
statutes creating the different boards, all proceedings were governed basic-
ally by Missouri's Administrative Procedure Act.
Each agency had an assistant attorney general assigned to it to act as
general counsel.183 After investigation of a complaint, if the board con-
templated a proceeding under the APA (e.g., to revoke a license), it ad-
vised its counsel to draft a formal complaint. At the hearing on the com-
plaint, the assistant would then act as the "prosecutor," and the board
members would sit as the court. After the hearing, the board would de-
liberate, and then direct its "prosecutor" to draft findings of fact and con-
clusions of law supporting its decision. If an appeal were necessary, the
same assistant would usually handle the appeal. Because of their familiarity
with each step of such proceedings, some of these assistant attorney generals
noticed several shortcomings in these proceedings.
The basic problem was that of the "classic case."' 8 4 In the "classic
case," the agency, after receiving a complaint about some allegedly illegal
activity by a licensee, would have its investigators look into the allegations.
(Or, if the agency did not have investigators, it might hold an investigative
hearing at which the complainant and witnesses would testify.) After the
investigator reported back to the agency, the members of the board would
meet, evaluate the report, and then, based on that evidence, decide if
formal action were necessary. If the board decided in the negative, that,
naturally, would dose the matter. Concern would arise only when the
board decided to proceed, and the licensee decided to contest the action. 8 5
Although the members of the board had already decided (with the advice
of counsel) that the evidence supported the allegations of illegal conduct, at
the hearing they would, figuratively, don black robes, sit as judge and
jury, and re-evaluate the same evidence. In addition, the leading witness
for the agency was often the board's own employee-investigator. Thus,
even if the licensee had controverting evidence, the board was usually
predisposed to decide against him, because (1) it had already decided
against the licensee in filing the complaint; and (2) from a practical stand-
point, it would tend to give weight to the testimony of its own employee.
The licensee was left with no real defense in any action where the
facts were in dispute. Even judicial review was effectively precluded by the
182. Interview with Albert J. Stephan, in St. Louis, Mo., Aug. 20, 1971 [here-
inafter referred to as Interview with Stephan]. Mr. Stephan is presently counsel for
the Board of Registration for the Healing Arts. He was an assistant attorney gen-
eral from 1961 to 1966, during which time he was counsel for numerous adminis-
trative agencies.
183. Assistant attorney generals still act as general counsel for the agencies
before the AHC, unless the agency has private (e.g., Board of Registration for the
Healing Arts) or house counsel (e.g., Division of Insurance).
184. Interview with Stephan.
185. It should be noted that many actions, under both the AHC and pre-AHC
procedures, are not disputed. Either the evidence is so overwhelming that the
licensee has no real defense, or the licensee does not appear at all.
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requirement that the licensee must prove that the board's decision was not
supported "by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole
record."' 8 6
This "controverted facts" situation occasionally produced dissatisfac-
tions even in cases where the board decided that the allegations against
the licensee were not substantial. Since many complaints originated from
the public (i.e., clients or patients).,8 7l it was commonly asserted that a
board (being composed of members drawn from its own profession or
occupation) was protecting its "own" if it dismissed a complaint. On the
other hand, if the board found the licensee "guilty," some board members
found it difficult to impose a full sanction when the evidence establishing
the violation, although clear, was not one hundred percent conclusive.' 88
The "classic case" emphasized the three in one problem of having the
same body exercise the conflicting functions of prosecutor, judge and jury.
A common understanding of human nature would itself suggest the dif-
ficulty of fairly executing the duties of each position, regardless of the
good intentions of the person or persons involved. The proper exercise of
any one function conflicted with the exercise of the others. Members of
the Attorney General's office were concerned with this dilemma, but under
the existing system there seemed no solution.
While the "classic case" was the most serious problem, there were
others. The lack of legal training of the members of a board was one. A
board, like a court, frequently had to rule on motions or objections. But
the board, unlike the court, was not legally trained and was normally
without the benefit of its counsel, who was acting as "prosecutor." The
prosecutor could not simultaneously fill the roles of advocate, and of
legal advisor to the board, although some tried.189 To avoid difficulties,
the "prosecutor" and opposing counsel would, if at all possible, stipulate
facts and agree on the presentation of evidence. The deficiencies of such
a practice are obvious. The board members' lack of legal training had the
further detrimental effect of stultifying the practice of filing written
briefs after the hearing. (Under the AHG practice the term "briefs" is
used to describe materials submitted after the hearing, and which are
normally described as "proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.")
Licensees' attorneys apparently realized the futility of submitting briefs.
Thus, one assistant attorney general, despite six years of practice with
licensing agencies, could recall only one or two instances in which briefs
were filed.' 9 0
186. § 586.140 (2), (3), RSMo 1969.
187. According to most of the agencies, client-licensee problems are the major
source of complaints.
188. Interview with James Flanagan, William Dolan, and Robert Leonard,
Real Estate Commissioners, in Columbia, Mo., Aug. 18, 1971.
189. A former assistant attorney general indicated how one agency solved this
problem. When opposing counsel objected, the assistant would signal the presiding
officer what the appropriate ruling was by pulling on his earlobe.
190. Interview with Stephan.
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Another problem was the absence of any "legal" atmosphere at the
proceedings. The licensee would receive a formal notice of the charges
against him; but if a "podiatrist thought that he was going to just sit
down and talk with some other foot doctors, it frequently happened that
[he] did not see a lawyer."''1 1 Licensees often did not fully comprehend
the possible ramifications of the action. As a result, they did not exercise
the rights they did have.1 92
A final, though fortunately rare problem was the use by a board of
its power to eliminate certain licensees, and thereby, restrict competition.
Several persons indicated that this problem had arisen, although no one
would give examples for the record.
Despite the shortcomings of the pre-AHC system, a movement for
change never got past the discussion stage, until a case arose, not exactly
in the "classic" form, which attracted widespread attention to the need
for fair and impartial hearings to licensees.' 03 In 1959, Dr. Harold Lischner,
a doctor of medicine licensed by the state of California, and then an in-
structor at the University of Missouri Medical School, applied for a Mis-
souri medical license. The Board of Registration for the Healing Arts,
over the course of some years, twice denied his application after hearings.
During the interim period, Dr. Lischner moved to Pennsylvania, where
he applied for and obtained a license to practice. In November of 1963
Dr. Lischner again applied for a Missouri license, and requested and was
granted a hearing, before the Board of Registration for the Healing Arts.
The hearing was presided over by the board members, a written record
was made and Lischner was represented by counsel.194
The record disclosed the following testimony: Lischner was a graduate
of an accredited medical school;' 9 5 his former and present colleagues had
only praise for his professional competence; because of moral and religious
beliefs, he had been a conscientious objector during World War I; while
18 or 19 years old, he was arrested for having left a conscientious ob-
jectors' camp, but charges against him arising out of the incident were
later "dropped" without a trial or conviction; 90 he conceded that he
would, as a matter of conscience, disobey laws which infringed upon the
right of free speech, or which would require restrictive covenants for
housing.1O7
Because of the unusual nature of the testimony (there were no wit-
191. Id.
192. Several persons interviewed disagreed with this conclusion. One individual
commented that licensees and applicants are "usually well-versed in their rights."
Interview with Robert Jones, Assistant Attorney General, in Jefferson City, Mo.,
June'30, 1971.
193. Lischner v. Board of Reg. for the Healing Arts, No. 22261 (Cir. Ct. Cole
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nesses for the Board), the assistant representing the Board, Alfred J.
Stephan, brought the case to the attention of Attorney General Thomas
Eagleton, prior to the Board's decision on the application. 198 Both Stephan
and Eagleton agreed that the Board had "no legal grounds for denying
[Lischner] a license to practice the healing arts in Missouri," and the
Board was so advised.199 Nevertheless, the Board voted unanimously to
deny Lischner a license on March 21, 1964. 00 The Board was asked to
reconsider its position, since the Attorney General's office had decided
that it would not defend the decision, if it were appealed. 20 Reconsidera-
tion became impossible when several events succeeded in freezing the
Board to its position. Governor John M. Dalton threw his support behind
the board's decision, and promised the Board outside counsel for the ap-
peal.2 0 2 At about the same time, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch broke the story
on its front page, saying Lischner had been denied a license "because of
his beliefs in pacifism and his record as a conscientious objector."203
With the news coverage the controversy became more heated. The
approaching gubernatorial election gave the dispute a political flavor,
with Secretary of State Warren Hearnes joining Eagleton in criticizing
both the Board's action, and Governor Dalton for supporting the Board.204
The Post-Dispatch gave the case much prominence, and in a veritable
deluge of articles and editorials, severely criticized the Board's action.205
At this point, the issue quickly escalated beyond the facts of the Lischner
case. In an editorial the Post-Dispatch, after stating that the question of
whether Lischner should get a license was for the courts, said: "the broader
policy question for public concern is whether a Missouri licensing board
(this or any other) should undertake to judge an applicant's moral char-
acter by judging his opinions and thoughts." 2 08
As expected, Lischner appealed the case (to the Circuit Court of
Cole County), contending that the Board's denial of licensure constituted
a deprival of due process and equal protection of the law; and that the
Board's action was arbitrary and capricious, and not based upon competent
198. Interview with Stephan; Interview with Sen. Thomas Eagleton, in Jef-
ferson City, Mo., July 24, 1971 [hereinafter referred to as Interview with Eagleton].
199. Letter from Thomas Eagleton to William D. Perry, President of Board
of Registration for the Healing Arts, March, 1964 (exact date unknown).
200. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 2, 1964, at 1A, col. 1. The reason for the
delay between the hearing in November and the decision in March is unknown.
201. Interview with Eagleton.
202. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 2, 1964, at IA, col. 1.
203. Id.
204. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 21, 1964, at 7C, col. 3.
205. From April through December, 1964, there were 18 news articles (several
of them headlines), 17 editorials, 3 editorial cartoons and numerous letters to the
editors. The editorials at times became quite vehement, one editorial being en-
titled "The Medical Inquisitors." St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 13, 1964, at 2C
(Editorial).
206. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 17, 1964, at 2C (Editorial).
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and substantial evidence upon the whole record.2 0 7 The Board's decision
was reversed in a memorandum opinion, which adopted plaintiff's re-
quested findings of fact and conclusions of law.208 The Board accepted the
decision and granted Lischner his license.
Although the Lischner case was hardly typical, it did focus attention
on the problems in the licensing structure. The problem was not that
board members were anything but persons of the highest caliber. The Board
of Registration for the Healing Arts was made up of good men. The
problem was that "good men make mistakes." 209 The defect was in the
system.
2. Legislative History
Lischner, despite its dissimilarity from the "classic" case, provided a
perfect springboard for solving the long noticed, but unchanged problems.
Realizing this, newly elected Lieutenant Governor Eagleton, along with
Stephan, Cullen Coil (a former Missouri Supreme Court Commissioner)
and others set out to establish an alternative system. Initially, they con-
sidered the procedures in several other states,21 0 and the federal system.
However, the "drafters" concluded that the alternatives all had the same
defect: the licensing authority was still both the prosecutor and the ultimate
trier of fact, even though the person conducting the hearing was inde-
pendent.211 A general court-martial type procedure, with an attorney
acting as a legal adviser to a court composed of the members of the agency,
was also considered and discarded.2 12 This latter system (as was the case
with other hearing examiner alternatives) overcame the lack of legal ex-
pertise in the board, but left the "prosecutor-judge-jury syndrome" 213 un-
207. Plaintiffs Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Lischner
v. Board of Reg. for the Healing Arts, No. 22261 (Cir. Ct. Cole Cty., Nov. 16,
1964).
208. Lischner v. Board of Reg. for the Healing Arts, No. 22261 (Cir. Ct. Cole
Cty., Nov. 16, 1964).
209. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 18, 1964, at 7C (Editorial).
210. The drafters were generally hazy on the extent to which they relied on
other states' procedures in drafting the AHC procedure, though they did admit
considering alternatives employed by other states. California, Maine and Alaska
are three states that have adopted alternatives.
California's APA provides for a hearing examiner, unrelated to the agency,
to preside over and conduct the hearing. The agency has the ultimate decisional
power, though it may adopt the examiner's decision. See CAL. GovT. CoDE §§
11370-528 (West 1966), as amended, (West Supp. 1972). See generally Bobby, An
Introduction to Practice and Procedure under the California Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 15 HAsr. L.J. 258 (1964). Alaska's system is similar to the California
procedure. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.250 (1967).
Under Maine's system the hearing officer not only presides over the hearing
but also has the ultimate decisional power. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2401-07(1964). See generally, Sawyer, The Quest for Justice in Maine Administrative
Procedure, 18 ME. L. Rv. 218 (1966). Quite possibly the drafters lifted the AHC's
name from Maine; their commission is also called the Administrative Hearing
Commission.
211. Interview with Eagleton.
212. Interview with Stephan.
213. Interview with Eagleton.
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changed. The conclusion was reached that an independent trier of fact
was essential. It was agreed that one "trier" would be fully capable of
handling the docket, after an analysis of the past case load. The proposed
legislative bill sought the establishment of one commissioner to hear these
disputes, and further required him to be an attorney.
The initial drafts left power with the commissioner to decide punish-
ment, but after consultation with the agencies, the drafters decided to leave
this responsibility within the agencies' jurisdiction. The agencies' profes-
sional expertise in their respective fields, and political expediency in passing
the bill, influenced this decision.214
Another significant decision at this juncture was to exclude the
supervisor of liquor control, whose jurisdiction comprehends thousands
of licensees, and whose authority is frequently challenged. The drafters
concluded that inclusion of the supervisor would generate enough opposi-
tion to seriously jeopardize the bill's chances of enactment.
The method of steering the bill through the legislature was planned
carefully. Senator John Downs was enlisted as the primary upper house
sponsor. Twenty-eight out of the 34 other senators joined in sponsoring the
bill. Representatives Ronald Reed and Jack Schramm spearheaded the
lower house fight.
The bill passed the Senate in substantially the same form as intro-
duced.2 15 An amendment offered by Senator Earl Blackwell, whereby the
governor would appoint a commissioner on a case by case basis, was de-
feated because of the belief that it would be difficult to get quality persons
under such a plan.2 16
The House battle was not as easy. Although a number of groups pub-
licly endorsed the bill, including several licensing agencies,2 17 there was
active opposition by four groups2 ls and behind the scenes lobbying by
214. Id.; Interview with Stephan.
215. The final Senate vote was 24-4 in favor of the bill. Mo. S.JouR., 73dGen. Ass'y 979 (1965). It is interesting to note that some of the sponsors did
not vote.
216. Interview with former state senator John Downs, in St. Joseph, Mo.,Aug. 13, 1971; Interview with former state representative Ronald Reed, in
St. Joseph, Mo., Aug. 13, 1971.
217. The bill was endorsed by the following groups:
Little Hoover Commission
Administrative Law Committees of the St. Louis, Kansas City and Mis-
souri Bar Associations
State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts




Letter from Lt. Gov. Thomas Eagleton to Gov. Warren E. Hearnes, July 14, 1965.
218. Those in opposition were the Missouri Funeral Directors Association,Missouri Optometric Association, Missouri Real Estate Association, and the Mis-
souri Division of Insurance. Id.
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many others.210 The amendments offered proved the opposition. For ex-
ample, amendments proposing deletion of the Real Estate Commission and
the Board of Nursing were offered, though only the former passed.22 0 An-
other amendment deleted the requirement that the commissioner be an
attorney.2 21 However, the Division of Insurance was added to the AHC's
jurisdiction.222
Substantially crippled by amendments, the bill was passed,223 and
referred to a House-Senate committee, which was heavily stacked in favor
of the Senate version of the bill. In the committee report political maneu-
vering eliminated all of the crippling amendments.22 4 This report was
adopted by a close vote in the house,225 with the help of some last minute
arm-twisting by Lieutenant Governor Eagleton.226 However, the battle
was not over. Opposition continued in an effort to have the bill vetoed,
but Governor Hearnes signed the bill on August 24, 1965.
In retrospect, Senate Bill 284 was passed because of the sponsors' hard
work, and the active support of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 27 Missouri had
taken a commendable step toward providing procedural protection for
licensees. Nevertheless, the fight necessary to pass the bill cast doubt on
whether the AHC could effectuate its purpose.
C. Proceedings Before the AHC
Regardless of whether the agency or the licensee 22 8 initiates the action,
the mechanics of proceedings before the AHC are simple; there are few
technical requirements and no traps. The statute and rules are straight-
forward. The AHC enabling act eliminated numerous minor differences
in proceedings under each agency's statute, and in addition, added a few
vital changes.
The first basic change was one of addition and clarification. Under the
individual statutes, no express provisions governed the requirement of a
hearing when an agency refused to examine an applicant, or refused to
issue or renew a license. For example, one statute merely stated: "The
219. Interview with former state senator John Downs, in St. Joseph, Mo.,
Aug. 13, 1971.
220. Mo. H. Joun., 73d Gen. Ass'y 1743-47 (1965).
221. Id.
222. 1d. at 1776-78.
223. Id. at 1778-79. The vote was 91 to 56.
224. Interview with Eagleton; Interview with John Downs, in St. Joseph, Mo.,
Aug. 18, 1971; Interview with former state representative Ronald Reed, in St.
Joseph, Mo., Aug. 18, 1971.
225. The vote adopting the report was 88 to 55, 82 votes being necessary for
passage. Mo. H. JoutR., 73d Gen. Ass'y 1820-21 (1965).
226. Interview with former state representative Ronald Reed, in St. Joseph,
Mo., Aug. 13, 1971. The difficulties that the sponsors encountered in the legisla-
ture casts some doubt on the ability of other states to adopt similar statutes. But
see note 30 and accompanying text infra.
227. Interview with former state representative John Downs, in St. Joseph,
Mo., Aug. 13, 1971.
228. For the sake of simplicity, "licensee" will be used to designate all in-
dividuals appearing before the AHC, whether or not currently licensed.
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Board may refuse to license individuals of bad moral character, or persons
guilty of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct.. *,"229 without stating
the procedure that should be followed. Section six of the bill expressly
covered this situation, by allowing the individual, upon refusal of any
agency to examine an applicant, or to issue or renew a license, to file a
complaint with the commission and thereby obtain a hearing.280 The
result is that today, when a dispute arises in the field of occupational
licensing, the most basic procedural right-the right to a hearing-is guar-
anteed in Missouri by statute.
A second basic change was the statutory requirement that the com-
missioner of the AHC publish rules of procedure.2 31 The rules that have
been subsequently published,28 2 and the conduct of the parties involved
have brought about some significant procedural improvements.288
As noted earlier in this study, one of the most important rights of the
licensee in a revocation or nonrenewal proceeding is the right to adequate
notice of the charges against him. The AHC rules on notice go far beyond
the requirements of the Model Act,28 4 and also eliminate any problems
that might be caused by the Missouri and Revised Acts.2 85 The statute
and rules require the commissioner to serve (either personally or by certi-
fied mail) the respondent (usually the licensee) with the complaint.28 6
Notice of the hearing is to be attached to the complaint, and must:
(b) Inform the respondent of his right to file an answer within
ten days of receipt of the complaint.
(c) Inform all parties of their right to request a pre-hearing con-
ference, to be represented by legal counsel and to a full, fair
and open hearing.... 27
229. § 834.100, RSMo 1969.
230. § 161.802, RSMo 1969. See APFmix No. 1 for the text of the act. In
fact, the boards did grant hearings in such cases (e.g., the Lischner case); but
whether such hearings were required under the previous statutes was open to
question.
This unfortunately does not mean that the right-privilege doctrine is dead
in Missouri. Bloom v. Board of Architects, Pro. Eng. & Land Surveyors, 474 S.W.2d
861 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971), dearly indicates that the doctrine still has vitality.
"[Elngaging in the practice of architecture .. . is a matter of privilege . . . and
not a matter of right." Id. at 864. The court held that the plaintiff, a licensed
Nebraska architect, was not entitled to a Missouri architect's license because (1)
there was no agreement for reciprocity between Missouri and Nebraska and (2)
he had not met the educational experiences and moral standards prescribed by
statute. Interestingly, the Board admitted that the Nebraska examination was es-
sentially the same as the one used in Missouri. Bloom v. Board of Registration
for Architects & Pro. Eng., AHC No. 68003 (Nov. 26, 1968). Nevertheless, the court
held that the Board's decision was one of "grace."
231. § 161.302, RSMo 1969.
232. See APPENDix No. 2 for the text of the rules.
233. See Table III infra for a survey of licensees' attorneys on practice and
procedure before the AHC.
234. See pt. II, § C (1) of this article.
285. See id.
286. § 161.282, RSMo 1969; AHC rule 7.02.
237. AHC rule 7.01 (3).
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These provisions provide protections greater than those found in ordinary
dvil actions in court, and leave little risk that a licensee will not be fully
and adequately informed of his rights, or of the nature and manner of
conduct of the proceedings.
Proper conduct of the hearing was the drafters' second major con-
cern.2 38 The statutory requirement that the commissioner publish rules of
procedure has itself been a significant advance, because, as is well known,
in many states such rules are not readily available.2 9 Every step of a
proceeding is now governed by this single set of rules. There are no varia-
tions from one agency to another as was the case before 1965. Real estate
agents receive the same treatment as nurses. Also, the establishment of one
administrator has enhanced the uniformity and consistency of proceedings
in several respects. First of all, the commissioner is a full time officer,
whose sole responsibilities are to conduct a fair hearing, and to render
an impartial decision. (By statute the commissioner cannot have outside
employment while in office.) Secondly, while the AHC statute and rules
have not expressly altered the substantive laws and evidentiary rules ap-
plicable to administrative proceedings, these proceedings are now super-
vised by an individual with legal training. As a result, rulings on motions
and evidentiary objections are now more likely to be consistent and correct,
and in addition, it is now more probable that the final decision will be
based on "competent" evidence. Finally, the adversary nature of actions
before the AHC makes it more likely that all relevant issues will be properly
raised, briefed and decided. The detailed findings of fact and conclusions
of law, which the AHC has produced, supports this assumption. Further,
these detailed opinions have produced the twin benefits of establishing
precedent (which aids predictability), and allowing effective judicial re-
view. The practice of having all hearings transcribed, similarly enhances
effective judicial review.
The third, and by far the most important change initiated by the
AHC was the substitution of an impartial trier of fact in place of the
board members; this substitution was the principal goal of the drafters.
The statute made this change by simply providing that:
The administrative hearing commission shall conduct hearings and
make findings of fact and conclusions of law in those cases wherein,
under the law, a license issued [by any one of the listed agencies]
may be revoked or suspended, or wherein the licensee may be
placed on probation or wherein an agency refuses to permit an ap-
plicant to be examined upon his qualifications or refuses to issue
238. It should be emphasized that while most of this discussion analyzes the
AHC rules and statute from the licensee's viewpoint, all of the procedural pro-
tections apply equally to a licensing agency, whether it is the petitioner or re-
spondent.
239. On the availability of rules at the state level, see Cohen, Publication of
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or renew a license of an applicant who has passed an examination
for licensing or who possesses the qualifications for licensure with-
out examination .... 240
Several aspects of the AHC statute make this procedure preferable to that
employed by other states. First of all, the AHC is the only hearer and
trier of fact; the agency has no discretion as to the employment of the
AHC procedure. Secondly, the statute contains an automatic capture
clause,2 41 and a clause repealing any inconsistent provisions of existing
statutes. 24 2 The latter provision eliminated the need expressly to amend
existing statutes, in order to bring particular licensing agencies within the
AHC's jurisdiction.24 3
These modifications and changes brought about by the creation of
the AHC can best be illustrated by a step-by-step analysis of each stage
of the proceedings. 244 The pre-complaint proceedings remain substantially
unchanged, and within the agencies' sphere of responsibilities. The boards
retain their powers of investigation and prosecution, but it is important
to remember that the manner in which the boards exercise these functions
varies substantially from board to board.
The day to day business of a licensing board is normally supervised
by an executive member of the board, who may or may not be a full-
time employee. While the board members make all final decisions, the
executive member is the one who executes the various functions of draft-
ing and conducting examinations, renewing licenses, initiating investiga-
tions and all other day to day procedures.2 45 The manner in which in-
vestigations are conducted depends upon the type of agency and its statutory
authorization.
Agencies like the Board of Barber Examiners, Boards of Cosmetology
and Board of Pharmacy have inspectors whose primary functions are to
make periodic investigations of licensees to see if they are complying with
the current health and safety regulations. A report of each investigation
is made to the board. Violations are rare and the licensee is usually given
an opportunity to make corrections or compliance. Since 1965 investiga-
tions by the above agencies have never proceeded to the complaint stage.24 6
240. § 161.272, RSMo 1969.
241. Mo. Laws 1965, at 277, § 12.
242. Id. § 11.
243. These provisions do not prevent an agency from expressly exempting
itself from the AHC.
244. The following discussion is based on interviews or correspondences with
licensees, their attorneys, the commissioners, and the agency members and their
counsel. See also APPENDix Nos. 1 and 2, and Tables 1-5 infra.
245. This only applies to independent licensing authorities. The state-controlled
and operated agencies are staffed by full time employees.
246. Interview with Lloyd W. Tracy, Secretary of the Board of Pharmacy, in
Jefferson City, Mo., July 22, 1971; Interview with Lawson E. Quinn, Secretary
and Treasurer of Board of Barber Examiners, in Jefferson City, Mo., July 22, 1971.
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If an agency has no full-time investigators, as is the case with several,
there are alternative modes of operation. First, one or more of the board
members may personally investigate the allegation, or hire someone (an
attorney for example) to investigate.247 Another option is to require a
formal notarized statement from the complainant.248 (This practice leaves
the weeding out of specious complaints to the AHC). A third alternative,
extensively used until 1970, when it was declared illegal, was the "investiga-
tive hearing."249
Whether the board makes its own investigation or employs investigators,
the procedure is similar to that used in a criminal action. There are several
distinct steps taken before formal action is brought, and at each step a
decision is made whether to proceed further. Complaints about a licensee's
illegal activity originate from various sources-third parties (often clients),
other governmental agencies (e.g., prosecuting attorneys), newspapers, or
the board's own investigator. Correspondence with available witnesses is
first used to clarify the facts. If in the executive member's opinion the
answers support a suspicion of illegal activity, an employee of the board or
agency will be detailed as an investigator to obtain further evidence. Most
complaints never reach this stage because they are licensee-client misunder-
standings which are easily resolved by letter, phone call, or conference
between the parties. If such approaches yield no results, however, or if
the allegations are more serious, an investigator may interview witnesses
and collect evidence. He may contact the licensee, although this is not
the usual practice. 250 The investigator's final report is referred to the
executive member, who may again decide that the allegations either have
no merit or are so difficult to prove that the case must be dosed. If his
decision is otherwise, the report is channeled on to the board as a whole.
The board may meet with the licensee in a further attempt to settle the
complaint.251 The board will decide whether to file a complaint, based
on a majority vote. An affirmative vote will cause the report to be referred
to the agency's counsel, who then drafts the complaint unless he is of
the view that no case can be made, 252 which again will end the matter.
When the time comes to draft a formal complaint the AHC statute
comes into effect. Though "no technical forms of pleading are required ' 253
247. For example, the Real Estate Commission follows this procedure. Inter-
view with James Flanagan, William Dolan, and Robert Leonard, Real Estate
Commissioners, in Columbia, Mo., Aug. 18, 1971.
248. The Real Estate Commission and the Board of Accountancy are examples
of Boards following this practice. Id.; Interview with Ruth Woodson, Executive
Assistant to the Board of Accountancy, in Jefferson City, Mo., Aug. 3, 1971.
249. See text accompanying notes 302-06 infra.
250. The licensee is usually aware of the fact that the agency is investigatinghim. See Table III, question 5, infra.
251. In approximately one-half of the cases there is some form of communica-
tion between the board and the licensee or his attorney. See Table III, questions
8, 10, infra.
252. Most of the agencies' counsel indicated that this did happen occasionally.
253. AHC rule 3.01 (1). See APPFNDiX No. 2.
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in the complaint, the petitioner-agency "must set forth in brief form the
specific act or acts of misconduct made against a licensee," 254 and further
specify the following:
(a) What license or licenses have been issued to respondent and
whether they are currently in good standing.
(b) The statutes or regulations which the petitioner believes have
been violated by the respondent.
(c) Sufficient facts adequately to appraise respondent of the
charges being made against him in order that he may properly
defend himself at the hearing.255
After the complaint is filed with the commissioner, the commissioner
serves a copy of the complaint upon the licensee, along with a notice of
hearing. Assuming that the licensee wishes to contest the allegations, 56
and consults an attorney,2 57 he has 10 days to file an answer. Since the
proceedings are similar to civil cases, discovery is the next stage. Any of
the parties may use depositions or interrogatories, as in a civil suit,25 8 and
they are often used if there are complicated issues of fact. Subpoenas
ad testificandum and subpoenas duces tecum are also available to the
parties.
A pre-hearing conference may be held before or after discovery. Al-
though the commissioner may require a pre-hearing conference on his own
motion, in practice one is held only at the request of one or more of
the parties.259 The commissioners have encouraged the use of pre-hearing
conferences and they are frequently employed.2 60 The conference has two
purposes, the first being an informal settlement of the dispute.261 The
survey of licensees' attorneys indicates that if a settlement and dismissal
are to occur, such a resolution of the controversy would most likely occur
at this stage of the proceedings.2 62 If the parties cannot agree, the second
goal of the conference becomes important. This goal is to insure that
there may be an orderly and efficient hearing, and the goal is sought to
be accomplished by having the parties discuss the following topics:
254. AHC rule 3.01 (2).
255. Id.
256. In 30% (26 out of 85) of the cases reaching a final decision, the licensee
either did not contest the complaint or did not appear at the hearing.
257. In 46 of the 204 cases considered, the licensee was not represented by
counsel
258. AHC rule 6.00.
259. Interview with AHC Commissioner John W. Carter, in Jefferson City,
Mo., Aug. 25, 1971.
260. Two-thirds of the attorneys who responded to the survey indicated that
a pre-hearing conference was held. See Table III, question 11 infra.
261. According to the survey, an attempt at settlement was made in two out
of every three cases. See Table III, question 12 infra.
262. See Table III, question 16 infra. For the reasons for these dismissals, see
Table III, question 17 infra. The settlement may be in the form of a consent
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(1) simplification of the issues;
(2) necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) limitation of the number of expert and character witnesses;
(5) Whatever pre-hearing motions have been filed in the case;
(6) manner and conditions upon which depositions can be taken;(7) anticipated length of the hearing and the time and location of
conducting such a hearing;
(8) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action.2 68
The next stage is the hearing itself and it must be held at least 20
days after notice, unless the parties agree otherwise. If discovery proceedings
are used a continuance is granted as a matter of course. The hearing is
conducted under rules established by the Missouri APA and the AHG
rules. The place of the hearing is determined by the commissioner and
is usually in a courtroom in the area of the respondent's and witnesses'
residence. Witnesses testify and are cross-examined under oath, and the
hearing is transcribed. Approximately 75% of the hearings are concluded
within one day.264
Oral argument may be allowed at the close of the evidence, but writ-
ten briefs are usually used instead.2 65 The petitioner is granted 30 days
to file such briefs; the respondent is granted an extra week or two. The
briefs, along with the transcript and exhibits, provide the material upon
which the commissioner decides the case. The findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, which are usually handed down within two weeks, may
include a recommendation as to punishment, if the respondent is found
"guilty." The case is dismissed if the respondent is found "not guilty."
If the decision is in the agency's favor, the agency must hold a hearing
on punishment within 30 days unless the parties have agreed that the
recommendation of the commissioner be binding. The licensee may appear
at the hearing before the board and offer evidence relevant to the dis-
ciplinary action. Such evidence may relate to extenuating or mitigating
circumstances, or may include testimony of character witnesses. The agency
itself may offer evidence but usually refrains from doing so as it is already
familiar with the facts from its involvement in the pre-complaint proceed-
ings. Once the disciplinary order is entered, there is a "final order" which
is appealable under the terms of the Missouri APA.
If licensee or applicant is the person aggrieved and wishes to object
there are minor differences in procedure. A licensee or applicant may
bring an action when the agency
263. AHC rule 5.01 (1)- (8).
264. See Table III, question 15 infra.
265. Oral argument has been used in 20% of the cases; written briefs arefiled in one-half of the cases. See Table HI, questions 18-20, infra. This represents
a marked increase in comparison with the pre-AHC use of oral and written argu-
ment. See text accompanying note 190 supra.
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(1) refuses to examine the applicant;
(2) refuses to issue a license when the applicant has passed the
examination or is entitled to licensure without examination or;
(3) refuses to renew a license.266
The complaint must be brought within 30 days of any such refusal and
must allege the grounds upon which the applicant believes he is entitled
to the examination or license.267 If the licensee files the complaint without
the benefit of counsel these rules are liberally construed on his behalf.268
Discovery, the pre-hearing conference, and the hearing are conducted
as stated above. The only other changes are in the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, which, if in the petitioner-licensee's favor, must state
an "appropriate order to accomplish such examination or licensure or
renewal." 269 Additionally, the agency has the right to judicial review if
it is aggrieved by a final decision, a preorgative not required under pre-AHO
law.
The foregoing description of the typical procedures employed by the
AHC provides a foundation for a discussion of the interrelation of the
parties with the AHO and their views on its success or failure.
D. The AHC-Alternative or Answer?
1. The Agencies' Opinions
The agencies under the jurisdiction of the AHC cover a diverse range
of activities, from medical doctors and securities brokers to automobile
inspectors and meat processors. The opinions expressed by the agencies
on the value and effectiveness of the AHC extend over an equally broad
spectrum. The views of agency members, employees, and attorneys varied
from those highly laudatory of its success to those extremely critical of
its shortcomings.
The criticisms will be detailed first. One of the most frequent attacks
on the Commission is that it has installed one man in the position of
a "czar" with a "life-or-death stranglehold" over the agency's function,
with the result that the power of the agency to control its licensees has
been usurped.270 This argument first appeared while the act was being
debated in the legislature271 and has not abated during the six years which
have elapsed since passage. However, these arguments appear to overlook
certain facts. The act did not strip the agencies of their control; the
agencies retain all of their traditional functions save one-that of trier of
266. § 161.302, RSMo 1969.
267. Id.; AHC rule 3.01 (3).
268. AHC rule 3.01 (5). Thus, in one case a letter from the licensee to the AHC
sufficed as the complaint.
269. § 161.302, RSMo 1969; AHC rule 8.01 (1).
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fact in adjudicative disputes. Investigation, prosecution, and punishment 272
are powers still solely within the agencies' jurisdiction. The extent to which
the agencies may employ their various powers is also within their discre-
tion. The "agencies can still investigate to 'beat hell'; they can accuse
whomever they want."2 3 Only when the licensee is entitled to a hearing
does the responsibility shift to the AHC. For the licensee to be found
in violation of any particular statute the prosecuting agency must, of
course, meet its burden of proof. However, this burden is technically no
different today than it was before 1965.
The agencies have also retained "authority" over their licensees in
other important respects. The power to promulgate rules is but one ex-
ample. Another example is well illustrated by the recent case of Bloom v.
Board for Architects, Professional Engineers & Land Surveyors.2 74 In that
case the Board refused to grant Bloom, a Nebraska certified architect, a
reciprocal license. Bloom brought an action before the AHC, and the com-
missioner ordered the Board to grant the license on the ground that the
Board's refusal was arbitrary, capricious, and in excess of the Board's
statutory authority.275 The St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit
court's reversal of the AHC, holding that, in the absence of any agreement
for reciprocity between Missouri and Nebraska, the Board had the sole
power to determine whether Bloom met the educational and experience
standards set by the statute.276 This case illustrates the fact that the boards
retain all substantive powers granted under their respective enabling acts,
and that such powers are unaffected by the AHC statute.
A criticism related to the contention that the AHC statute "stripped
the agencies of their power" is that a "czar" cannot possibly "govern" 19
different areas of conduct with any kind of effectiveness. The argument
that the commissioner cannot thoroughly familiarize himself with the
manners of each agency's law, and therefore cannot make responsible
decisions, was also frequently asserted in 1965,277 and is still made today.
One man not a member of our profession cannot be aware of our
problems. We feel that no one man is qualified to sit in judgment
over [19] boards. [The commissioner] is not technically qual-
ified or informed.
Commissioners past and present agree that this criticism is groundess:278
272. § 161.292, RSMo 1969. Based on a comparison of the punishment im-
posed by the agencies, which follow the AHCs recommendation approximately
70% of the time. When an agency has not followed the recommendation, the
peunishment imposed has been more severe in approximately 50% of the cases and
ess severe in the remaining cases.
273. Letter, supra note 270.
274. 474 S.W.2d 861 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
275. Id. at 863.
276. Id. at 864-65. But see note 230 supra.
277. Letter, supra note 270.
278. Interview with AHC Commissioner John W. Carter, in Jefferson City,
Mo., Aug. 25, 1971; Interview with former AHC Commissioner Eugene Bushman,
in Jefferson City, Mo., Aug. 25, 1971.
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[A]ny attorney, with above average intelligence, willing to work,
can read the complaint, hear the evidence and testimony of wit-
nesses, read the briefs and research the cases in the briefs and then
write a sound [decision].279
'Since the questions which the AHC typically decide concern whether the
licensee has complied with the law, as set out in the agency's statute and
rules, the needed expertise is simply the legal ability to construe and
interpret these requirements. Counsel for the agency and for the licensee
exhibit a similar expertise when initiating or defending an action, yet
no one has questioned the ability of these persons to understand the law.
Moreover, the issues are frequently neither complicated nor peculiar
-to any one particular agency. Approximately one-third of all revocation
proceedings involve three characteristics or activities proscribed by each
.licensing law-drug addiction or alcoholism, conviction of a felony, and
lack of good moral character. 28 0 These questions are basically ones of fact.
'While other cases have involved substantial problems of interpretation or
construction of statutory terms, none of the commissioners expressed any
difficulty in understanding the issues, although some indicated that sub-
stantial research has sometimes been necessary. Former Commissioner Bush-
man answered the "no expertise" criticism by saying "I was bored after
three years. The job had ceased to be challenging." It should also be
noted that while the most difficult and complicated cases have arisen in
the real estate and insurance fields, neither the Real Estate Commission
nor the Division of Insurance ever expressed any doubts about the com-
-missioner's ability to understand the issues to make a reasonable decision.
Interrelated with this last criticism is the belief of some agency mem-
bers that since the commissioner is not an expert, he cannot render a
"fair decision":
The hearing commissioner does not understand our profession so
[he] is usually very unfair in his rulings.
One man not a member of our profession cannot be aware of our
problems, and cannot render a fair decision.
There has also been general dissatisfaction by some boards with the AHC's
rulings:
He has required the registration of [applicants] unqualified by law.
The AHC usurps the board's rightful authority to determine [ques-
tions of violations].
279. Interview with AHC Commissioner John W. Carter, in Jefferson City, Mo.,
Aug. 25, 1971.
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It did not seem that the commissioner tried to understand the
board's position.
By bringing or defending the action, the agency ex necessite has con-
cluded that its position is correct. Any failure to win will inevitably cause
some understandable dissatisfaction.2 81 Nevertheless, the decision records
do not indicate that the AHC has rejected agency judgment to any great
extent. In fact, the agencies have been remarkably successful. In revocation
proceedings, for example, the petitioning boards have been victorious al-
most 90% of the time, having lost only 8 of 70 cases going to final de-
cision.282 Seven of these eight losses have involved the Real Estate Com-
mission (four losses) and the Division of Insurance (three losses). But
these are two agencies which now express general approval of the AHC,28 3
despite disagreements in the past. If one adds to the 70 cases going to final
decision those disputes settled by consent or without a formal opinion (i.e.,
dismissed at some point before final decision with the agreement of the
parties) the boards' views have prevailed in about 73% (93 out of 126)
of the total proceedings initiated by the boards. 28 4
The record of the agencies when the licensee is the petitioner is not
as impressive. The licensee (or applicant) has prevailed (either by decision
or settlement) in 21 out of 36 cases. 285 From the survey and interviews
this statistic appears to explain some of the dissatisfactions with the AHC
expressed by board and agency members. The board or agency members
believe that they should have the right to make the determination whether,
for example, an applicant has "good moral character." Without an un-
reviewable preorgative on this issue, the board or agency members believe
that they cannot upgrade their own standards.286 Thus, the criticisms
suggest a dissatisfaction with the basic policy of the AHC statute-to limit
the preemptive power of the boards to determine questions of fact and
law-rather than any dissatisfaction with the way in which the AHC has
actually conducted itself.
281. Ten out of 23 board members responding to a survey said they were not
satisfied with the decisions of the AHC. See Table IV infra. Some of this dis-
satisfaction may have been caused by several cases in which the AHC was re-
versed on appeal. Nineteen cases have been appealed; 4 cases are pending, 3
cases have been dismissed on appeal; 1 case was affirmed in part and reversed in
part; 6 cases have been affirmed; and 5 cases have been reversed. All of the re-
versals have been on questions of law.
282. See Table I infra.
283. Interview with James Flanagan, William Dolan, and Robert Leonard,
Real Estate Commissioners, in Columbia, Mo., Aug. 18, 1971; Interview with
Michael Pfaff, Counsel for the Division of Insurance, in Jefferson City, Mo.,
Aug. 17, 1971.
284. See Table I infra. Because most of the actions brought against the Super-
intendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol by the owner of a motor vehicle in-
spection station or an inspector (mechanic) result in consent orders (licensee
agrees that he violated the law; the Patrol agrees to reissue the license immediately
or by a specified date), the statistics on these cases have been omitted.
285. See Table II infra.
286. Isn't it questionable whether a licensing agency can upgrade standards
without a change in the statutes or rules?
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The attorneys for the agencies or boards are more favorably disposed
towards the AHC than the members. Although agency counsel frequently
disagree with AHC decisions, they nevertheless agree that a proceeding
before an independent trier of fact is essential for due process. In addition,
-they agree that the hearings are conducted in a fair manner, and that
the agency usually gets a "fair shake." Counsels' opinions of the commis-
sioners, past and present, were also complimentary. The commissioners, in
their words, were "scrupulously fair" and -extremely conscientious" in
discharging the functions of a quasi-judicial officer.
It should be pointed out that some of the attorneys for the agencies
agreed that it would be desirable to revert to the pre-AHC procedure under
which the agency or board held its own hearing.28 7 This thought, based
on the genuine belief that the agency or board can render a better decision
than the AHC, has manifested itself throughout the last six years in various
lobbying attempts and avoidance schemes.,
Several agencies fought hard to defeat or at least to eliminate them-
selves from the AHC statute from the very moment it was first introduced
in the Senate.288 Despite legislative rejection of the exemption petitions,
lobbying efforts to restrict the AHC have continued. In 1967, the Division of
Insurance attempted to have itself exempted from the Commission's juris-
diction. The Division urged that, as an agency staffed with professionals
(as opposed to most other independent boards) it was as well-equipped as
the AHC to handle licensing disputes involving insurance agents, brokers
and companies. 28 9 A compromise which eliminated only the licensing of
insurance companies from AHC jurisdiction was reached only when the
supporters of the AHC threatened to kill the entire bill which included
other changes unrelated to the AHC.29 0 Other attempts by agencies to ex-
empt themselves from the AHC have also been made.291 One such attempt
may have succeeded. A 1967 revision of the Board of Accountancy statute
re-enacted the pre-1965 provisions which allow the Board to hold its own
hearings, without mentioning the AHC,2 92 as other amendments have.2 93
While the form of this amendment may have been the product of over-
sight rather than an overt plan, the Board of Accountancy may not be
technically subject -to the AHC, although it has, in fact, never challenged
the AHC's jurisdiction.
The original bill did not explicitly repeal provisions of other statutes
conflicting with the AHC bill, because the drafters decided that this was
287. According to the survey of board members there is a 50-50 split on this
question. See Table IV infra.
288. See pt. III, § B (2) of this article.
289. Interview with former AHC Commissioner Eugene Bushman, in Jeffer-
son City, Mo., Aug. 25, 1971.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See § 326.130; RSMo 1969.
293. See, e.g., § 332.341, RSMo 1969.
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an impossible task.2 94 Subsequent amendments to licensing. statutes have
not always helped. One section now provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section [an applicant]
shall not be entitled to a certificate . . . if the board finds . . .
that the applicant is not a person of good moral character.2 05 .
Does this mean the board's determination is conclusive? Is this an attempt
to avoid the AHC? Again, it is unclear.
Other avoidance schemes have been more obvious. A 1967 decision
of the AHC irritated the Division of Insurance. After the Division's attempt
to exempt itself from the AHG failed, the Division began a practice of
informal circumvention of the AHO. An insurance agent must have a
contract with an insurance company before he can be licensed, and this
contract may be cancelled by either party at any time. The Division,
after investigating a licensee and establishing grounds for a complaint,
would inform the licensee's company of the allegations. The company
would take the "hint" and cancel the agent's -contract, thereby causing
the agent's license automatically to lapse. While this practice has since
been discontinued, the abrupt drop-off in the number of cases "filed by
the Division after 1967 supports the assertion that this practice was em-
ployed.2 06
Another practice which can circumvent the AHC is that of informal
settlement. Formal settlements are encouraged and occur quite frequently
within the AHC in the form of consent orders and dismissals with prejudice.
In such a case, the licensee may admit the allegations of the complaint in
exchange for a promise of lenient punishment. This process is similar to
plea-bargaining and can be beneficial to both parties. Each saves time and
money without substantial sacrifice of purpose.2 9 7 With the high per-
centage of favorable decisions won by the agencies before the AHC, settle-
ments are naturally becoming more frequent. However, it should be noted
that informal settlements are not always either visible to or subject to the
approval of the AHC. They are handled entirely by the agency. In the
typical case, the licensee agrees to surrender his license in exchange for
294. Interview with John Downs, in St. Joseph, Mo., Aug. 13, 1971. In retro-
spect, the drafters felt that explicitly repealing the conflicting sections would have
solved many problems.
295. § 327.331 (5), RSMo 1969 (emphasis added).
296. Following are the number of cases filed per year by the Division of
Insurance and the percentage they comprise of the total filed that year:





1970 1 .... 2.3
1971 (through Sept.) 5 27.7
297. The survey of licensees' attorneys (Table III) included a question.on the
fee charged to the licensee. In 22 cases the fee was greater than $600; most of these
cases were contested. :
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the opportunity-to reapply for it at a latter date. Whether or not informal
settlements are desirable (e.g., the goal of "deterrence" is obviously sacri-
ficed because with the informal settlement, no public record of the action
is generated), they are frequently used.
A practice no longer employed is refusing to renew the licensee's
permit rather than to seek rev6cation. Most licensing statutes require the
licensee to "renew" his license annually.298 In the past, if the agency had
received complaints about a licensee, it could avoid the time and expense
of prosecuting a complaint by refusing to renew the license. The licensee
often conceded 'without a fight, either because he could not afford to
contest the action, or did not think he would have a chance if he did
contest.299 The frequency of this practice is unknown, although a number
of agencies conceded that they had used it.
The legality of refusing to renew a license solely on the basis of un-
supported allegations of illegal activity was first questioned in the 1970
AHC case of'Graham v. Real Estate Commission.30 0 The Real Estate Com-
mission had denied petitioner's request for renewal of his license because
several of his customers had complained of certain of his activities. The
petitioner filed a complaint with the AHC, contending that the Real Estate
Commission had no-discretion not to renew his license once the statutory
requirements (e.g., payment of a fee) had been met. The AHO agreed,
finding that the section in question3 01 required renewal upon proper ap-
plication, because the legislature could hardly have intended that the
Real Estate C ommission make a yearly re-examination of the credentials
of every broker and salesman. The Graham decision was not appealed be-
cause the same issue was before the Kansas City Court of Appeals in the
case of State ex rel, American Institute of Marketing Sytems v. Real Estate
Commission30 2 on a writ of prohibition.
The American Institute of Marketing Systems (AIMS) had applied for
the annual renewal of its license, and, instead of allowing or refusing
renewal, the Real Estate Commission held investigative hearings to deter-
mine if its application should be denied. Several hearings were held before
the writ was brought. AIMS argued that the Commission had no statutory
power to hold investigative hearings or to refuse AIMS' request for renewal.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals agreed on both points.303 The court
298. See, e.g., § 331.050, RSMo 1969. The licensee still technically has hislicense since it has not been suspended or revoked. The license "lapses" until the
licensee obtains his yearly renewal.
299. Robert Ginzburg was one licensee who did contest the refusal to renew
his license. See Ginzburg v. Division of Insurance, AHC No. 70017 (June 17, 1971).
Mr. Ginzburg did indicate that he knew of several insurance agents who did not
contest the refusal to renew for the reasons stated. Interview with Robert Ginzburg,
in St. Louis, Mo., Aug. 20, 1971.
300. AHC No.-70001 (June 29, 1970).
301. § 339.060, RSMo 1969.
802. 461 S.W.2d 902 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970).
303. Id. at 908.
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decided that the AHC statute had stripped the agencies of all powers to
hold hearings, that the Real Estate Commission could only refuse to renew
a license for a "reason or condition which might warrant the refusal of
the granting of a license,"3 0 4 and that allegations alone were not such a
reason or condition. 305 The Real Estate Commission's statutory obligation
was to renew the license irrespective of the allegations, and thereafter to
initiate proper revocation proceedings.
After the decision in the AIMS case, agency or board counsel advised
against refusing to renew licenses. Some agencies indicated, however, during
interviews, that they had not received such advice. The members of one
agency, although admitting they knew of the AIMS case, refused to answer
the question whether they were still following the practices condemned
in that decision. "08
When it is remembered that there is a considerable body of adminis-
trative opinion hostile to the concept of the Administrative Hearing Com-
mission, the decision in AIMS is particularly significant. The position of
the AHC as the trier of fact was strengthened because the licensing agencies
are no longer permitted to bypass the AHC by treating a refusal to renew
as an option within their discretion and not subject to the AHC. The
licensing agencies cannot hold their own "investigative" hearings to deter-
mine the sufficiency of allegations of fact bearing upon the status of a
licensee. Instead of authorizing two proceedings, with the attendant time
and expense (an agency investigation and hearing on the renewal issue,
followed by an AHC proceeding dealing with a failure to issue), the licensee
and the board have only one proceeding before the AHC-a proceeding
at which all issues can be resolved and disposed.
As indicated earlier, not all of the agencies have disagreed with the
concept of having an independent trier of fact. Several agencies supported
the idea from its inception and an increasing number are recognizing its
value. For example, the Board of Registration for the Healing Arts, after
losing the Lischner case on appeal, supported the idea of having hearings
"conducted by someone . . . legally trained, a judge or a licensing com-
missioner."3 07 While other agencies have complained that the AHC device
reduces their capacity to control illegal conduct, the record of the Board
of Registration for the Healing Arts indicates how effective an agency
can be. The Board has been involved in 33 disputes and has prevailed,
either through favorable decision or settlement, in every instance.3 08 This
remarkable record suggests that an agency retains substantial power, if,
and only if, it exercises its investigatory and prosecutorial powers in a
diligent and responsible way. The reputation for integrity which the
304. § 339.060, RSMo 1969.
305. 461 S.W.2d at 906.
306. The survey of board members indicated that this practice is still used.
See Table IV infra.
307. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 4, 1964, at IA, col. I.
308. See Table I infra.
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Board has thereby acquired has the beneficial side effect of encouraging
informal settlements. 309
Another body which appears pleased to be relieved of the obligation
lo hear and decide complaints is the Real Estate Commission. The present
commissioners of this agency have observed that the holding of adjudica-
tive hearings is unduly time-consuming.310 With the AHC assuming this
burden, the commissioners have more time for their professional responsi-
bilities as well as more time for their other duties as commissioners. The
Real Estate Commissioners also stated that the AHC has not frustrated
the policies of the licensing laws but, rather, has had just the opposite effect
by allowing those policies to be more effectively achieved. Under the
previous agency-run proceedings, the Real Estate Commissioners believed
that an agency was naturally reluctant to revoke a license because no
independent evidentiary hearing was available to establish that a licensee
had violated the law. As a result it was asserted that the agency was inclined
to be unduly lenient in punishing the licensee. Under the AHC, however,
the commissioners of the Real Estate Commission "have no reluctance
whatsoever about revoking a license, if a man has violated the law accord-
ing to the Commissioner [of the AHC]."311 The conclusion of these com-
missioners was: "We like it and we think it is great."3 12
2. The Licensees' Opinions
The prevailing opinion of those responsible for the establishment of
the AHC was that the licensees would be the primary beneficiaries. It
was intended that due process for the licensee would be a reality rather
than a dream. In the judgment of both the licensees and their attorneys,
this goal has been achieved. Both groups were overwhelmingly compli-
mentary of the theory of the AHC as well as the way in which it has
worked out in practice.
Looking at the record alone, the licensees (and applicants) have been
triumphant in 33% of the actions. While only 20 final decisions313 have
been in their favor, 34 other complaints have been settled or dismissed
to the individual's benefit. This modest won-lost ratio may not look im-
pressive at first glance, but when it is considered that each of the 20 out-
right victories occurred in a contested case where, a fortioti, a victory at
the hearing level would have been very unlikely before 1965, the record
becomes impressive, indeed. In addition, many of the favorable settlements
and dismissals were undoubtedly influenced by the conclusion that actions
adverse to the licensee would not be upheld by an independent trier of
fact (the AHC).
309. Interview with Stephan.
310. Interview with James Flanagan, Robert Leonard, and William Dolan,
Real Estate Commissioners, in Columbia, Mo., Aug. 18, 1971.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See Tables I & II infra. Actually. 23 decisions have been in the licensees'
favor, but 3 of these were reversed on appeal.
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However, case statistics, by themselves, do not indicate that the objec-
tive of fair and impartial hearings has been attained. The survey of licensees'
attorneys gives a clearer picture.314 There follow four of the questions asked
in the survey of licensees' attorneys, together with the responses:
In your opinion was the decision a just one?
38-Yes 6-No
Were you satisfied with the way the proceedings were con-
ducted?
51-Yes 4-No
Would you have preferred a court trial to the AHC hear-
ing?
12-Yes 51-No
Were the proceedings preferable to a proceeding before
the agency (as before the creation of the AHC)?
54-Yes 4-No
The foregoing statistics speak for themselves. The comments made in
the survey further amplify the attorneys' satisfaction with the conduct of
hearings before the AHC:
Commission was extremely fair, helpful and cooperative.
Commissioner acted with complete fairness and impartiality.
I cannot speak too highly of the intelligent and judicious manner
in which the commissioner handled the case ....
*1
AHC [provides] a quick and just way to have a hearing.
The questionnaire on suggested changes in the AHC315 throws further
light on the attorneys' opinions of the AHC. Almost 80% of the attorneys
responding to the survey felt that the AHC's procedure should cover liquor
licensees, and over 60% indicated that the AHC should be expanded to-
include general areas of administrative law other than licensing.316 These
recommendations appear to reflect the attorneys' satisfaction with the con-
cept and workability of the AHC.
The licensees interviewed concurred in their attorneys' approval of
the Commission, although many were critical of their own licensing agen-:
cies. One licensee first commented that the agencies "don't give a damn
about the welfare of the public if the public's welfare interferes with their
own selfish interests," but then stated that the hearing was conducted
314. See Table III infra.
315. See Table I infra.
316. Interestingly, only about 20% of the attorneys thought it would be a
good idea to give the AHC jurisdiction over bar admissions and disciplinary
actions. Attorneys are different-aren't they?
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"very fairly." Another individual, after saying "nobody could have got
a fairer hearing," followed with the left-handed compliment that the AHC
"isn't a JP court."3127
This impressive support is in contrast with the agencies' divergent
opinions on the effectiveness of the Commission. But, from the beginning,
it was never expected that the agencies would unqualifiedly back the
change, or that they would be as enthusiastic as the licensees. Still, this
predicted endorsement by the licensees must be given great weight in
answering the question: Is the AHC a mere "alternative" or has it proved
to be a genuine "answer" to the deficiencies in the licensing process?
3. The AHC Commissioners' Views
A licensee or applicant typically appears before the agency only once.
The agencies appear more often, but, considered individually, their involve-
ment is only sporadic. The commissioner is himself the only one who is
associated with the AHC on a continuing day to day basis. Any discus-
sion of Missouri's AHC procedures must, therefore, consider the commis-
sioners' views on the effectiveness of the office, as well as how they view
the commissioner's role in the entire administrative structure.
To date three individuals have filled the role of commissioner, two
as full-time commissioners and one as an acting commissioner.3 18 The com-
missioner, according to statute, must be an attorney, but he is prohibited
from practicing law during his six-year term of office. The governor ap-
points the commissioner, with the advice and consent of the Senate and
also appoints acting commissioners, if necessary. This latter provision, which
has already been used to fill an unexpired term, would apparently allow
the temporary appointment of an acting commissioner if the commis-
sioner was, for example, to disqualify himself because of an interest or
connection with a party.31 9
The commisioner's duties as a quasi-judicial officer are apparent from
a reading of the statute. Briefly, his tasks are to serve the complaint and
817. Somewhat surprisingly, a number of applicants and licensees were aware
of the Lischner case and the basic reason for the establishment of AHC, i.e., the
prosecutor-judge-jury problem. But this awareness apparently comes from being
involved in a case, since the licensees also felt that their counterparts were gen-
erally unacquainted with the existence of the AHC. From interviewing doctors,
dentists, nurses, insurance agents, barbers, real estate agents, and pharmacists who
had never been involved in an action before the AHC, this writer would have
to agree that licensees are unaware of the AHC. None of the persons interviewed
could identify the AHC.
818. Eugene Bushman took office as the first Commissioner in November, 1965.
He resigned in January, 1969, and Paul Williams was appointed as acting Commis-
sioner. John Carter is the present Commissioner. He was appointed in February,
1970.
819. This provision would thus eliminate the doctrine of necessity, which was
applicable to agency-conducted hearings. This doctrine states that if only one
tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, the members of the tribunal cannot be dis-
qualified unless the law provides for substitution of personnel. See, e.g., Brinkley
v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936).
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answer on the parties, set the date and place for the hearing, conduct a
pre-hearing conference (if one is requested), rule on any pretrial motions,
preside over hearing and oral argument, write findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, certify the record if judicial review is sought, and publish
rules of procedure. These responsibilities are similar to those of a judge
sitting without a jury.
The commissioner's most important responsibilities, however, are to
preside at the hearing and to write the opinions. According to the present
Commissioner, the latter is the most time-consuming and taxing duty of
the two.320 While the opinions in uncontested cases are short and pro
forma, the findings of fact and conclusions of law can become quite lengthy
and difficult to write in actions involving hotly disputed questions of
fact or law. For example, in one case there were 10 days of hearings, hun-
dreds of exhibits, and numerous witnesses. In addition to reading the
detailed briefs that were filed, the Commissioner had to sift through a record
of over 1300 pages before reaching his decision.82 1
The workload of the Commission, which was low in the first years,
has been steadily increasing.3 2 2 Cases are presently being filed at the rate
of over 50 per year (between 20 and 25 cases may be pending at any one
time), and decisions are being handed down at the rate of approximately
one every two weeks.3 23 While a number of agency officials and attorneys
thought there was too little work for the Commission, the present Com-
missioner maintains that in view of the rate at which he is handing down
320. Interview with AHC Commissioner John W. Carter, in Jefferson City,
Mo., Aug. 25, 1971.
321. This particular case also proved that licensing cases can be expensive. The
licensee's attorneys' fees were $21,500.
322. Following is the number of cases filed per year:






(Jan.-Sept.) 1971 - 23
Total 204
The drop-off in cases filed in 1967 and 1968 was caused by the Division of In-
surance's avoidance of the AHG. See note 296 supra. The increase in the last
two years is also atributable to the addition of the Missouri State Highway Patrol
to the AHG's jurisdiction. See note 284 supra. The Board of Nursing Home Ad-
ministrators, the Commission of the Department of Agriculture (licensing of meat
processors), and the Commissioner of Securities (licensing of securities brokers
and dealers) have also been placed in the AHC's realm, but none of these agencies
have as yet been involved in an action.
323. Eighty-eight cases have resulted in a decision, 59 of these being contested
cases where the licensee appeared and actively defended the action. Seventy-three
cases have been dismissed. The 20 cases involving the Highway Patrol are not
included in the figures, since 17 of the 20 cases have ended in consent orders.
See note 284 supra. In the 7 months from September, 1971, to March, 1972, the
AHC handed down 21 decisions.
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decisions and the time involved in presiding over hearings, an additional
commssioner may well be necessary to handle the job in the future.
The commissioners all view themselves as quasi-judicial officers. They
agree that one of their prime duties is to move the docket along and make
prompt decisions. While commissioners have frequently been praised for
their ability to keep the docket current, 324 a recurring criticism is that
cases take too long from start to finish. Some of this delay is required by
statute (e.g., 10 days to answer a complaint), and, after analyzing the cases,
the balance of the delay appears to be unavoidable if justice is to be done.
If the case is contested, it averages almost six months from beginning to
end.8 25 This time span is not unreasonable because discovery procedures
alone may push the hearing back weeks or months. Also, the parties have
several weeks to file briefs after the record is transcribed (which often takes
a month) and the commissioner needs some time to write the decision.
But if a decision is needed in a hurry, as where a vehicle safety inspector
seeks renewal of a license, it is reached quickly-in an average of only 37
days. The criticism of the delay in contested cases stems from the worry
that unqualified licensees may continue to violate the law while the case
is pending. According to attorneys familiar with the pre-1965 procedures,
decisions were reached more promptly, but the protections of discovery,
pre-hearing conferences, transcribed records, and briefs were unknown at
that time. The only answer to the criticism of undue delay may be that
"due process is a slow process."32 6
The commissioners have placed a high degree of emphasis on the im-
portance of the pre-hearing conference, although they have differed in
their approaches. While the first Commissioner, Eugene Bushman, pre-
ferred actively to participate in the conference, the present Commissioner,
Commissioner Carter, does not involve himself in the discussions. He be-
lieves that he should hear the evidence at the hearing and not before.
Regardless of the differences in attitudes between these two Commissioners,
324. As a result of this effort, three cases have been dismissed for lack of
prosecution, though this was not done before numerous attempts were made to
hear the case.
325. Time in days from filing of complaint to decision:
Cases reaching a final decision (excluding the Highway Patrol cases)
85 cases mean - 174
median - 131
Contested cases reaching a final decision
59 cases mean - 209
median - 167
Uncontested cases reaching a final decision
26 cases mean - 94
median - 45
Highway Patrol Cases
20 cases mean - 44
median - 37
326. Interview with Assistant Attorney General Harvey Tettlebaum, in Jef-
ferson City, Mo., July 9, 1971.
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conferences have been used in two out of every three cases.32 7 All of the
commissioners have encouraged settlement, stipulations, limits on the num-
ber of witnesses, and other time-saving devices. They believe that such
steps have increased the number of settlements, and, where no settlement
is reached, expedite the hearing process.
The argument by the agencies that the commissioner is a "czar" with-
out sufficient expertise to govern 19 different areas of conduct was dis-
missed by the commissioners as totally without foundation. On the "czar"
criticism they all agreed that as a quasi-judicial officer, the commissioner's
role is limited to one very narrow slice of the license-regulation spectrum.
Each one of the Administrative Hearing Commissioners has apparently
made a continuing effort to publicize the Commission's purpose and scope
and to make its functions and responsibilities known to the agency and
board members subject to its jurisdiction. Apart from this "educational"
function, however, none of the commissioners has had any real contact
with such boards and agencies. Each commissioner had the impression that
if anything, he was isolated from the agencies. In answer to the "no ex-
pertise" argument it was pointed out that the cases often involve ques-
tions of statutory construction and interpretation, and that attorneys are
better qualified to discharge this responsibility than non-lawyers, no matter
how well qualified the latter may be in their own callings.
Because the primary goal of the AHC is to place an impartial legal
expert in the role of trier of fact, the caliber of the individual selected
to fill this post has an effect on the degree to which this goal is attained.
In the opinion of the licensees, their attorneys, and the agencies' counsel,
the Commission has been fortunate in attracting high quality commis-
sioners.3 28 Some licensing board members were critical of the commissioners
(e.g., "biased"), but such persons, by and large, were the same persons who
were opposed to the AHC in principle. Other interested parties found the
hearings well run and the decisions relatively prompt and impartial. In
these respects, at least, the goal of the "creators" has been met.
E. An Answer
As previously stated, the professional or occupational licensee needs
three broad protections: (1) a guarantee to a hearing; (2) a guarantee
that the hearing, after being granted, will be fairly conducted and lead
to a just result; and (3) the right to effective judicial review.
By statute, the AHC clearly entrenches the first protection-the guaran-
tee to a hearing. The one statutory loophole caused by refusing to renew
licenses was closed by the AIMS decision. Also, in revocation proceedings,
the requirement that the licensee be afforded full notice of the nature of
327. See Table No. I infra.
328. The ability of the AHC to continue attracting high quality individuals
for this job is seriously affected by the $13,500 salary. Commissioner Carter indi-
cated that this salary would be a prime factor in forcing him to leave.
[Vol. 37
55
et al.: Fair Treatment for the Licensed
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING COMMISSION
the complaint means that the licensee can effectively assert his rights at the
hearing.
The creators' primary reason for establishing the AHC was to achieve
the second goal of guaranteeing a fair and impartial hearing which will
lead to a just result. By providing for an independent, legally trained trier
of fact, the statute eliminated ipso facto the most basic of the pre-1965
defects, that of the "classic case"3 29 in which the roles of investigator,
prosecutor and judge were combined.
Today the "hearing officer" (i.e., the AHC) is fully independent from
the agency or board. The commissioner has but one responsibility-properly
to exercise the functions of his office as trier of licensing disputes. While
it cannot be unequivocally stated that in every case a "just" result is reached,
the AHC statute and rules have provided for a predictable, uniform, and
consistent administration of the licensing laws. At the same time, the
proceedings have become more lawyer-like. The increased use of pre-hearing
conferences, discovery devices, transcribed records, written briefs, and oral
argument has upgraded the decision-making process. The resulting formality
has, at the very least, given the AHC process the aura of impartiality and
respectability. The consensus of the parties is that this goal of impartiality
has been reached.
The need for the third protection-the right to effective judicial re-
view-should diminish to the extent that the first two protections are
strengthened. Nevertheless, transcribed records, correct evidentiary rulings
and detailed opinions have improved the chance of more effective judicial
review whenever necessary.
The continued vitality of the AHC is basically dependent upon the
parties' approval of the Commission's performance. Overall, the parties have
been pleased with the Commission's operation. The only dissatisfaction
emanates from a few board and agency members, but even these dissatisfac-
tions appear to be on the wane. The argument that certain licensing
functions are unique and therefore inapropos for the AHC is contradicted
by the experiences of several agencies which have proven that the system
can work if the agency wants it to work. The Board of Registration for
the Healing Arts has established an impressive record of aggressive regula-
tion and control by utilizing its retained functions of investigation and
prosecution with firm but fair policies. The Real Estate Commissioners
similarly realize that the AHC has relieved them from a function (hearing
329. There is one exception to this statement that the problems of the "classic"
case have been eliminated, as exemplified by the case of Masters v. Board of Reg.
for the Healing Arts, AHC No. 71019 (Dec. 17, 1971), rev'd, No. 25,656 (Cole Cty.
Cir. Ct., April 15, 1972). The case involved the revocation of Masters' probation-
which had been granted by the Board after a decision by the AHC. The issue
in the case was the propriety of the Board's hearing on the revocation of proba-
tion. While there is no doubt that the Board had the power to revoke Masters'
probation, such an action has all of the inherent defects of agency-conducted hear-
ings, since the Board is the prosecutor, judge and jury.
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and deciding cases) for which they are not professionally equipped. There
remains, however, some opinion that the various Board or Agency mem-
bers are more capable of doing the Commission's job even though they
are without legal training. Such persons are highly qualified and well-
intentioned individuals. They are, for example, fine veterinarians, funeral
directors, etc. But they are not necessarily qualified to judge their fellow
licensees when the issues are disputed fact or legal questions unrelated to
technical competence. Possibly, as one assistant attorney general has sug-
gested, the solution is merely one of educating these board or agency
members. 330 If they understand the purposes and advantages of the AHC,
they can, as some licensing boards have demonstrated, use the Commis-
sion with effective results.
That the AHC is an effective "answer" to the procedural problems
previously encountered in agency-conducted hearings is readily apparent.
It is much more than a mere alternative. Effective administration of the
licensing laws has continued despite the regularizing of the adjudicative
aspects of the proceedings by utilizing an independent trier of the facts
in licensing disputes. The AHC's success is such that serious consideration
should be given to extending its jurisdiction (or at least the principles of
the AHC) to cover (1) liquor licensing; (2) bar admissions and disciplinary
actions; and (3) other non-licensing administrative proceedings. The AHC
has proved that it can work. It is an "answer" that other states may well
wish to consider.
330. Interview with Assistant Attorney General Robert Jones, in Jefferson City,
Mo., June 9, 1969.
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The following questionnaire was sent to 188 attorneys, who as a group had
been involved in 153 cases before the AHC. In the other 51 cases the licensee
was not represented by counsel. Fifty-eight questionnaires were returned. Questions
4-8 were asked of attorneys representing the licensee as respondent; questions 9
and 10 were asked only of attorneys representing the licensee as a petitioner.
1. Were you aware of the AHC prior to the case you handled?
56 Yes 9 No
2. How did you become involved in the case?
35 regular dient
14 "one time" client
15 referral
8. Have you ever referred any licensing cases to other attorneys?
5 Yes 63 No
If the action was against the licensee:
4. What was the basis of the licensing board's petition?
6 lack of good moral character
6 conviction of a felony
5 drug addiction or alcoholism
88 other statutory violation
5. Was your client aware of a complaint against him, either through contact by
investigators, reports from third persons or as a result of a letter, before the
action was filed with the AHC?
42 Yes 8 No
6. If so, was an informal settlement attempted before the complaint was filed?
25 Yes 17 No
7. What was the length of time between your first awareness of the complaint and
the actual filing? 90 days average.
8. Did you ever meet with the licensing board members?
30 Yes 36 No
If the action was by the applicant or licensee (9 and 10):
9. Did the case involve original issuance, or refusal to renew?
9 original issuance
7 refusal to renew
10. Did you communicate or meet with the board in an attempt to settle, before
the action was filed?
10 Yes 8 No
11. Was a pre-hearing conference held?
44 Yes 22 No
12. Was an active attempt at settlement made (regardless of whether a pre-hearing
conference was held)?
44 Yes 22 No
13. Did the commissioner encourage settlement?
35 Yes 30 No
If not, should he have?
9 Yes 21 No
14. Did the commissioner actively participate in the settlement?
16 Yes 37 No
If not, should he have?
3 Yes 21 No




4 more than 2 days
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16. If the case was dismissed, when was it dismissed?
7 before pre-hearing conference
19 after pre-hearing conference, but before a full hearing
5 after a full hearing
17, Why was the case dismissed, if it was?
7 consent order
9 lack of evidence
6 difficulty of proof
11 other reasons
18. Did you file a written brief after hearing?
23 Yes 26 No
19. Did the petitioner file a written brief?
24 Yes 24 No
20. Did you have oral argument after healing?
10 Yes
21. Did the agency hold a hearing on punishment?
12 Yes
22. Was the punishment imposed?
12 as recommended?
4 less severe than recommended?
2 more severe than recommended?
39 No
7 No
23. In your opinion, was the decision a just one?
38 Yes 6 No




22 more than $600
25. Were you satisfied with the way the proceedings were conducted?
51 Yes 4 No
26. Would you have preferred a court trial to the AHC hearing?
12 Yes 51 No
27. Was the proceeding preferable to a proceeding before the agency (as before
the creation of the AHO)?
54 Yes 4 No
TABLE IV
SURVEY OF LICENSING BOARD MEMBERS*
1. Are the licensees under your board's jurisdiction generally
aware of the existence and procedures of the AHC?
2. Would the board prefer to hold its own hearings'as to
revocation or suspension of licenses without having to
resort to the AHC?
3. Does the board hold investigative hearings?
4. Does the board ever refuse to renew a license?
If so, is the licensee advised of his opportunity to
appear before the AHC?
5. Would the board prefer to have the AHC decide punishment?
6. Generally, has the board been satisfied with the decisions
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TABLE V
SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THE AHC *





Licensing of insurance companies?
General questions of administrative law other than
licensing (e.g., welfare eligibility)?
2. Should the commissioner's salary ($13,500) be in-
creased to.that of a circuit court or appellate judge?
3. Should the commissioner be appointed under the Mis-
souri Non-Partisan Court Plan rather than directly
appointed by the governor?
4. Should appeals be to a court of appeals rather than
circuit court?
5. Should the commissioner be able to set punishment
rather than just recommend. it?
6. Should a- board of three commissioners hear the case








6This questionnaire was sent to 133 licensees' attorneys. Fifty-eight responded.
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161.252. Administrative hearing commission created-commissioner-appointment-
term-compensation
There is hereby created a state administrative agency to be known as the
"Administrative Hearing Commission," which is assigned to the division of regis-
tration and examination of the state department of education. It shall consist of
one commissioner. The commissioner shall be appointed by the governor with
the advice and consent of the senate. The term of the commissioner shall be for
six years and until his successor is appointed, qualified and sworn. The commis-
sioner shall be an attorney at law admitted to practice before the supreme court
of Missouri, but shall not practice law during his term of office. The commissioner
shall receive annual compensation of thirteen thousand five hundred dollars
and shall be entitled to actual and necessary expenses in the performance of his
duties. The office of the administrative hearing commission shall be located in
the City of Jefferson and it may employ necessary clerical assistance, compensation
and expense of the commissioner to be paid from appropriations from general
revenue made for that purpose.
161.262. Acting commissioner, when appointed-compensation
If a commissioner during his term of office becomes temporarily incapacitated
by illness or otherwise to perform the duties of his office, the governor shall
appoint some person to perform the duties of the office during the incapacity
of the commissioner. The person appointed shall have all the powers and duties
of the office and shall possess all of the qualifications of the office except that he
may continue in the private practice of law but shall not practice during this
period before any agency mentioned in section 161.272 nor in connection with
matters with which any of the agencies are involved. He shall receive the remuner-
ation provided for the office of commissioner during the time which he serves.
161.272. Commission to conduct hearings, make determinations-boards included
The administrative hearing commission shall conduct hearings and make
findings of fact and conclusions of law in those cases wherein, under the law, a
license issued by any of the following agencies may be revoked or suspended or
wherein the licensee may be placed on probation or wherein an agency refuses
to permit an applicant to be examined upon his qualifications or refuses to issue
or renew a license of an applicant who has passed an examination for licensure
or who possesses the qualifications for licensure without examination:
Missouri State Board of Accountancy
State Board of Registration for Architects and Professional Engineers
State Board of Barber Examiners
State Board of Cosmetology
State Board of Chiropody and Podiatry
Missouri Dental Board
State Board of Embalming and Funeral Directors
State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts
Division of Insurance
State Board of Nursing
State Board of Optometry
Board of Pharmacy
Missouri Real Estate Commission
Missouri Veterinary Medical Board
161.282. Complaints-notice-agency may retain counsel
Upon receipt of a written complaint from an agency named in section 161.272
in a case relating to a holder of a license granted by such agency or upon receipt
of such complaint from the attorney general, the administrative hearing commis-
sion shall cause a copy of said complaint to be served upon such licensee in person
or by certified mail, together with a notice of the place of and the date upon
-which the hearing on said complaint will be held. In any case initiated upon
-complaint of the attorney general, the agency which issued the license shall be
given notice of such complaint and the date upon which the hearing will be
held by delivery of a copy of such complaint and notice to the office of such
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agency or by certified mail. Such agency may intervene and may retain the services
of legal counsel to represent it in such case.
161.292. Commission's findings and recommendations-hearing by agency on
disciplinary action
Upon a finding in any cause charged by the complaint for which the license
may be suspended or revoked as provided in the statutes and regulations relating
to the profession or vocation of the licensee, the commission shall deliver or
transmit by certified mail to the agency which issued the license the record of
the proceedings before the commission together with the commission's findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The commission may make recommendations as
to appropriate disciplinary action but any such recommendations shall not be bind-
ing upon the agency. A copy of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and the
commission's recommendations, if any, shall be served upon the licensee in person or
by certified mail. Within thirty days after receipt of the record of the proceedings
before the commission and the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recom-
mendations, if any, of the commission, the agency shall set the matter for hearing
upon the issue of appropriate disciplinary action and shall notify the licensee of
the time and place of the hearing, provided that such hearing may be waived by
consent of the agency and licensee where the commission has made recommenda-
tions as to appropriate disciplinary action. In case of such waiver by the agency
and licensee, the recommendations of the commission shall become the order of
the agency. The licensee may appear at said hearing and be represented by counsel.
The agency may receive evidence relevant to said issue from the licensee or any
other source. After such hearing the agency may order any disciplinary measure it
deems appropriate and which is authorized by law. In any case where the commis-
sion fails to find any cause charged by the complaint for which the license may be
suspended or revoked, the commission shall dismiss the complaint, and so notify
all parties.
161.802. Complaint of license applicant-hearing-order
Upon refusal by any agency listed in section 161.272 to permit an applicant
to be examined upon his qualifications for licensure or upon refusal of such
agency to issue or renew a license of an applicant who has passed an examination
for licensure or who possesses the qualifications for licensure without examina-
tion, such applicant may file within thirty days after the delivery or mailing by
certified mail of written notice of such refusal to the applicant a complaint with
the administrative hearing commission. Such complaint shall set forth that the
applicant has passed an examination for licensure or is qualified to be examined
for licensure or for licensure or renewal without examination under the laws
and administrative regulations relating to his profession and shall set out with
particularity the qualifications of such applicant for same. Upon receipt of such
complaint the administrative hearing commission shall cause a copy of said
complaint to be served upon the agency by certified mail or by delivery of such
copy to the office of the agency, together with a notice of the place of and the
date upon which the hearing on said complaint will be held. If at the hearing
the applicant shall show that under the law he is entitled to examination for
licensure or licensure or renewal, the administrative hearing commission shall
issue an appropriate order to accomplish such examination or licensure or re-
newal, as the case may be.
161.512. Time and place of hearing
No hearing provided for in sections 161.252 to 161.342 shall be held less
than twenty days after the issuance of notice of said hearing except with the
consent of all parties. Hearings before the administrative hearing commission may
be held in any county in the state or in the city of St. Louis, within the discretion
of the hearing commissioner after he has considered the convenience of the
parties involved.
161.322. Administrative procedure
The provisions of chapter 536, RSMo, and any amendments thereto, except
those provisions or amendments which are in conflict with sections 161.252 to
161.342, and any civil rule hereafter adopted which supersedes an applicable pro.
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vision of chapter 536, shall apply to and govern the-proceedings of the administra-
tive hearing commission and the rights and duties of the parties .involved. .
161.332. Judicial review
All final decisions of the administrative hearing commission shall be subject
to judicial review as provided in and subject to the provisions of sections 536.100
to 536.140, RSMo, provided that in cases where a disciplinary order may be en-
tered by the agency, no decision of the administrative hearing commission shall
be deemed final until such order is entered. For purposes of review, the action
of the commission and the order, if any, of the agency shall be treated as one
decision. The right to judicial review as provided herein shall be available to
administrative agencies aggrieved by a final decision of the administrative hearing
commission.
161.342. Commission to publish rules-scope
The administrative hearing commission shall publish and file with the secre-
tary of state rules of procedure for the conduct of proceedings before it. The ad-
ministrative hearing commission may provide in such rules, among other things,
for the filing of responsive or supplementary pleadings, for the conduct of a
conference prior to any hearing wherein the issues to be determined at such-hearing
shall be defined, and for the conduct of a conference subsequent to any hearing
for the purpose of determining the extent and scope of the commission's action.
Section 11 of the original act. (Not printed in the Revised Statutes.) Any
provisions of existing statutes pertaining to the administrative agencies listed in
section 3 (§ 161.272) which are in conflict with this act are repealed. Section 12 of
the original act. (Not printed in the Revised Statutes.) If in the future there
would be created by law any new or additional administrative agencies which
agencies would have the power to issue, revoke, suspend, or place on probation
any licensee, then such agencies will come under the provisions of -this law.
APPENDIX No. 2
RULES GOVERNING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
BEFORE THE
MISSOURI ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING COMMISSION
Filed in the Office of Secretary of State the 5th day of October 1970.
Amendments to Rule 7.02 and Rule 8 filed the 23rd day of February 1972. Rule
11 filed the 10th day of April 1972.
The rules governing the practice and procedure before this Commission are
tools to accomplish a fair and impartial hearing in an orderly, prompt and
judicial manner. Substantial compliance of these rules is required for -a uniform
administration of the law, although the ends of justice will control in any particular
situation. They will be filed with the Secretary of State's Office in Jefferson City,
Missouri, and will be amended from time to time.
RULE NO. 1. DEFINITION.
1.00 The following definitions are applicable to these rules unless other-
wise specifically provided or unless plainly. repugnant to the intent of the
law or the context thereof.
1) "Commission" shall mean the Administrative Hearing Commission.
"Commissioner" shall mean the duly appointed Administrative
Hearing Commissioner or the acting commissioner.
(3) "Agency" shall mean those agencies subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, which are as follows:
Missouri State Board of Accountancy;
Commission, State Department of Agriculture;
State Board of Registration for Architects, Professional Engineers, and
Land Surveyors;
State Board of Barber Examiners;
State Board of Cosmetology;
State Board of Chiropody; - :
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State Board of Chiropractic Examiners;
Missouri Dental Board;
State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors;
State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts;
State Board of Nursing;
State Board of Optometry;
Board of Pharmacy;
Missouri Real Estate Commission;
Commissioner of Securities;
Missouri Veterinary Medical Board-
Division of Insurance
(4) "Licensee" shall mean those persons holding a license granted by
an agency.
(5) "Applicant" shall mean those persons who have been denied the op-
portunity to be examined upon their qualifications for licensure by an agency
or those persons who have passed an examination for licensure, or those who
possess the qualifications for licensure without an examination, and have
been denied a license or license renewal by an agency.
(6) "Complaint" shall mean the initial pleading filed by or on behalf of
an agency or the Attorney General in a case relating to the suspension or
revocation of a license or the initial pleading filed by or on behalf of an
applicant in a case relating to the examination, issuance or renewal of a
license.
(7) "Answer" shall mean a responsive pleading filed by or on behalf of
an agency, the Attorney General, or a licensee.
(8) "Supplementary Pleading" shall mean any other pleading in addi-
tion to a complaint or an answer which is filed in a proceeding before the
Commission.
(9) "Petitioner" shall mean the party filing the complaint, which party
shall be the moving party at the hearing and carry the burden of proving the
issues raised in the complaint.
(10) "Respondent" shall mean the party charged in' the complaint,
which party shall have the right to respond to such pleading by filing an
answer and to appear in person and be represented by legal counsel in any
proceeding held in connection with such complaint.
(11) "Legal Counsel" shall mean any person currently enrolled by the
Missouri Bar (integrated) and licensed to practice law in the State of
Missouri.
(12) "Commission's Office" shall mean Room 131, Capitol Building, Jef-
ferson City, Missouri, phone number 635-0128.
RULE NO. 2. POWERS AND DUTIES.
2.00 Powers and Duties-Agency or Attorney General Files Complaint.
The Commission shall conduct hearings and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law in those cases wherein, under the law, a license issued by
an agency may be revoked or suspended or wherein the licensee may be
placed on probation. In such cases the Commission may make recommenda-
tions as to appropriate disciplinary action, which shall not be binding upon
the agency.
2.01 Powers and Duties-Applicant Files Complaint.
The Commission shall conduct hearings and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law in those cases wherein an agency refuses to permit an ap-
plicant to be examined upon his qualifications or refuses to issue or renew
a license of an applicant who has passed an examination for licensure or who
possesses the qualifications for licensure without examination. If the ap-
plicant shall show that under the law he is entitled to be examined for li-
censure, to be licensed or have his license renewed, then the Commission shall
issue an appropriate order to accomplish such examination, licensure or re-
newal, as the case may be.
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RULE NO. 3. COMPLAINTS.
3.00 Complaints-Who May File and Where.
(I) Any agency or the Attorney General may file a written complaint
with the Commission, at its office in Jefferson City, Missouri, charging a
licensee with having violated certain statutes or regulations relating to the
profession or vocation of the licensee.
(2) An applicant may file a written complaint with the Commission, at
its office in Jefferson City, Missouri, seeking an order permitting the applicant
to be examined upon his qualifications for licensure or to require an agency
to issue a license or to renew the license of said applicant.
3.01 Complaints-Form and Content.
(1) All complaints shall be in writing and shall be simple, concise and
direct. No technical forms of pleadings are required. The complaint shall
give the full name and address of the petitioner and the respondent. The
original, which is to be filed with the Commission, must be signed by the
petitioner, its, or his, authorized agent or legal counsel. There must be suf-
ficient copies of the complaint to serve all necessary parties to the case. Suitable
space shall be provided on the caption of the complaint for the Commission to
affix the appropriate case number. All averments shall be in numbered para-
graphs; the contents of each shall be limited as far as practicable to a state-
ment of a single set of circumstances, and a paragraph may be referred to
by number in all succeeding pleadings.
(2) All complaints filed by or on behalf of an agency or the Attorney
General must set forth in brief form the specific act or acts of misconduct
made against a licensee. The complaint shall, among other things, specify
the following:
(a) What license or licenses have been issued to respondent and
whether they are currently in good standing.
(b) The statutes or regulations which the petitioner believes have
been violated by the respondent.
(c) Sufficient facts to adequately apprise respondent of the charges
being made against him in order that he may properly defend himself
at the hearing.
(3) All complaints filed by or on behalf of an applicant shall contain a
short and plain statement of the facts showing that:
(a) The petitioner has passed an examination for licensure under
the laws and administrative regulations relating to his profession or
vocation and is entitled to a license or license renewal from the re-
spondent; or,
(b) The petitioner possesses the qualifications for licensure without
an examination under the laws and administrative regulations relating
to his profession or vocation and is entitled to a license or license re-
newal from the respondent; or,
(c) The petitioner is entitled to be examined upon his qualifications
for licensure by respondent under the laws and administrative regulations
relating to his profession or vocation.
(4) All complaints filed by or on behalf of an applicant shall be filed
after the delivery or mailing by certified mail of written notice of the agency's
refusal to allow said applicant to be examined for licensure or to issue or
renew a license.
(5) The requirements of Rule No. 3.01 will be liberally construed in those
cases wherein an applicant prepares and files a complaint on his own behalf.
3.02 Complaints-How Served.
(1) Upon receipt of a complaint filed by or on behalf of an agency or
an applicant, the Commission shall cause a copy of said complaint to be
served upon the licensee or the agency, whichever be the case, in person or
by certified mail.
(2) Upon receipt of a complaint filed by or on behalf of the Attorney
General, the Commission shall cause a copy of said complaint to be served
upon the licensee named in the complaint, in person or by certified mail,
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and shall also serve a copy of such complaint upon the agency which issued
the license by delivering a copy of the complaint to the office of the agency
or by certified mail. In such situations, the agency will be permitted to inter-
vene in the case and be represented by legal counsel retained by the agency.
RULE NO. 4. ANSWERS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PLEADINGS.
4.00 Answers.
(1) A respondent has the right to file an answer in response to any
complaint served upon him. All answers shall be in writing and must admit
those portions of the complaint which respondent believes are true and deny
those portions of the complaint which respondent believes are not true. The
answer shall contain a short and concise statement of those facts which the
respondent believes are true and relevant to the issues raised in the complaint.
The answer must be signed by the respondent, its, or his, authorized agent
or legal counsel and shall be filed with the Commission at its office in Jef-
ferson City, Missouri. A copy of the answer shall be mailed by respondent
to all parties.
(2) In those cases wherein an applicant has filed a complaint and an
agency files an answer, the answer shall set forth in brief form the specific
grounds upon which it denied petitioner a license, a license renewal or the
opportunity to be examined for licensure. Unless the answer specifically
pleads that petitioner has failed to comply with Rule No. 3.01 (4), such re-
quirements will be deemed as admitted or waived by respondent.
(3) All answers shall be filed within ten days after respondent receives
a copy of the complaint. However, the failure to file an answer within the
time provided herein will not prevent the Commission from holding a pre-
hearing conference or a hearing at the time and place specified in the notice,
nor will such failure divest the Commission of its jurisdiction to render a
decision in the case.
4.01 Amendments and Supplementary Pleadings.
(1) Complaints may be modified or amended without leave of the Com-
mission at any time preceding the filing of an answer by the respondent.
After respondent has filed his answer, leave must be granted to amend or
modify any complaint.
(2) Answers may be modified or amended without leave of the Commis-
sion at any time up to five days preceding the date on which the hearing in
the case is actually held. After such time, all modifications or amendments to
answers may be made only upon leave being granted by the Commission.
(3) Any pleading, other than a complaint or an answer, may be filed
in any case pending before the Commission if leave is first granted.
RULE NO. 5. PRE-HEARING CONFERENCES.
5.00 Pre-Hearing Conferences-Setting.
(1) All pre-hearing conferences will be held as ordered by the Com-
mission, with reasonable notice of the time thereof being given to the parties
involved.
(2) Any party, or their legal counsel, may petition the Commission to
hold a pre-hearing conference at a time prior to the setting of a conference
by order of the Commission.
(3) The legal counsel who will actually handle the hearing shall be
present at all pre-hearing conferences, unless excused by the Commission.
Parties to an action may appear in person with counsel at a pre-hearing
conference.
5.01 Pre-Hearing Conference-Subject Matter.
Legal counsel for all parties shall attend the pre-hearing conference and
be prepared to discuss the following items:
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admission of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert and character witnesses;
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(5) Whatever pre-hearing motions have been filed in the case;(6) The manner and conditions upon which depositions can be taken;
(7) The anticipated length of the hearing and the time and location
of conducting such a hearing;
(8) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
RULE NO. 6. DISCOVERY.
6.00 Any party may take and use depositions and or written interrogatories
in the same manner, upon and under the same conditions as in civil actions
in the Circuit Court pursuant to Section 536.073 RSMo. 1969.
RULE NO. 7. HEARING.
7.00 Hearing-Notice.
(I) Attached to all complaints served by the Commission will be a notice
of the place of and the date upon which the hearing on said complaint will
be held.
(2) A copy of the notice will also be served upon the petitioner or his
legal counsel.
(3) The notice shall:
(a) Contain the caption and number of the case;
(b) Inform the respondent of his right to file an answer within
ten days of receipt of the complaint;
(c) Inform all parties of their right to request a pre-hearing con-
ference, to be represented by legal counsel, and to a full, fair and open
hearing as provided for in Sections 161.252 et seq. and Chapter 536
RSMo. 1969, as amended.
7.01 Hearing-Location, Time, Continuance.
(1) All hearings shall be held in Jefferson City, Missouri, although they
may be held in any county of the state or the City of St. Louis, at the dis-
cretion of the Commissioner, if it be shown at the pre-hearing conference or
otherwise that the convenience of the parties involved requires such special
setting.
(2) No hearing shall be held less than twenty days after the issuance
of notice of hearing except with the consent of all parties.
(3) The hearing date may be continued from time to time upon order
of the Commission and notice to the parties. Any party may request a con-
tinuance, provided good cause be shown. When a hearing is rescheduled, notice
shall be given to all parties in letter form by certified mail and shall specify
the location, time and date of the hearing.
7.02 Hearing-Procedure.
(I) The provisions of Chapter 536, RSMo. 1969, and any amendments
thereto, except those provisions or amendments which are in conflict with
Sections 161.252 to 161.342, RSMo. 1969, and any amendments thereto, and
any civil rule hereafter adopted which supersedes an applicable provision of
Chapter 536, shall apply to and govern the proceedings of the Administrative
Hearing Commission and the rights and duties of the parties involved.
(2) All hearings shall be open to the public. All parties have the right
to be present, represented by legal counsel, present evidence, and file briefs
within the time period specified in Rule 7.02.
(3) Upon request of any party, the Commission shall issue subpoenas
and, in a proper case, shall issue subpoenas duces tecum. The form in which
all subpoenas shall issue, their method of service and the procedure for
enforcing such subpoenas shall be governed by Section 536.077 RSMo. 1969.
All subpoenas shall be served and witness fees paid by the party requesting
them; however the Commission may have subpoenas and subpoenas duces
tecum served by the Sheriff of the county in which the witness resides. Sub-
poenas and subpoenas duces tecum shall be available to any party for pur-
poses of discovery.
(4) The petitioner will present his proof in the form of exhibits and
witnesses, who shall submit to any questions and cross-examination under
oath, following which the respondent shall present his proof in the form
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of exhibits and witnesses, who shall also submit to questions and cross-
examination under oath. Before testifying, witnesses may be excluded from
the hearing, in the discretion of the Commission, and witnesses may be kept
separate and prevented from conversing with each other until after all have
testified. At the close of the hearing, the Commission will take the case under
submission. Written briefs shall be filed by the parties who request leave
to file written briefs within the time period fixed at the hearing, but no
later than fifty (50) days after the close of the hearing.
(5) The parties may file a written stipulation as to some or all of the
facts. Such stipulation shall not preclude the offering of additional evidence
by any party. Parties may also stipulate to a violation and the suspension of
any license for a period certain, in which case the Commission shall enter a
Consent Order in accordance with such stipulation and dismiss the Com-
plaint with prejudice. All stipulations shall be signed by the applicant or
licensee and all attorneys of record of the parties.
(6) The Commission shall cause the proceedings in all hearings to be
suitably recorded and preserved at its expense. In hearings involving the
suspension or revocation of a license, wherein the Commission finds any
cause charged by the complaint, the Commission shall, at its expense, cause
the preparation of one copy of the transcript of the hearing. Under all other
circumstances, copies of the transcript will be prepared at the request and
expense of the party or parties concerned.
8.00 In all cases wherein a license may be suspended or revoked or wherein
the licensee may be placed on probation, the Commission shall make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law and enter its decision within sixty (60)
days after the close of the hearing. When requested by any attorney of
record, a copy of the proposed findings and conclusions shall be mailed to
all attorneys of record ten (10) days prior to the date upon which they will
be entered and will become final. The Commission shall send to all parties,
by certified mail, a copy of the findings of fact and conclusions of law when
they become final.
(1) Upon a finding on any cause charged by the complaint, the Com-
mission shall deliver or transmit by certified mail, to the agency which issued
the license, the record of the proceedings before the Commission together with
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision. In such cases, the Com-
mission may make recommendations as to appropriate disciplinary action.
(2) If the Commission fails to find any cause charged by the complaint,
the Commission shall dismiss the complaint.
8.01 In all cases wherein the petitioner seeks examination for licensure
or the issuance or renewal of a license, the Commission shall make findings
of fact and conclusions of law and enter its decision within sixty (60) days
after the close of the hearing. When requested by any attorney of record, a
copy of the proposed findings and conclusions shall be mailed to all attorneys
of record ten (10) days prior to the date upon which they will be entered
and will become final. The Commission shall send to all parties, by certified
mail, a copy of the findings of fact and conclusions of law when they become
final.
(1) If the Commission shall find that, under the law, the applicant is
entitled to examination for licensure or licensure or renewal, it shall issue
an appropriate order to accomplish such examination or licensure or renewal.
(2) If the Commission fails to find the applicant entitled to examina-
tion or licensure or renewal, it shall dismiss the complaint.
RULE NO. 9. JUDICIAL REVIEW.
9.00 All final decisions of the Administrative Hearing Commission shall
be subject to judicial review as provided in and subject to the provisions of
Sections 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo. 1969, as amended, provided that in
cases where a disciplinary order may be entered by the agency, no decision
of the Administrative Hearing Commission shall be deemed final until such
order is entered. For purposes of review, the action of the Commission and
the order, if any, of the agency shall be treated as one decision. The right
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to judicial review as provided herein shall be available to administrative
agencies aggrieved by a final decision of the Administrative Hearing Com-
mission.
RULE NO. 10. AVAILABILITY OF COMMISSION'S RULES.
10.00 The rules of procedure of the Commission, and any amendments,
additions or modifications thereto, shall be available to the public at the office
of the Commission in Jefferson City.
RULE NO. II WAIVER OF HEARING.
11.00 A licensee may waive a hearing before the Administrative Hearing
Commission and consent with the agency to the suspension, revocation or
other relinquishment to the agency of his licensee or registration certificate.
In that event a stipulation agreement shall be signed by the licensee and
agency and filed with the Administrative Hearing Commission. A consent
order approving the stipulation agreement shall thereafter be issued if it is
determined by the Administrative Hearing Commission that the waiver of
hearing and stipulation agreement were voluntarily made and entered into.
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